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**NAVAL
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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**AN ALTERNATE MILITARY STRATEGY FOR THE WAR
ON TERRORISM**

by

Peter J. Canonico

December 2004

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Peter J. Gustaitis
Glenn Harned

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AN ALTERNATE MILITARY STRATEGY FOR THE WAR ON TERRORISM

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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ABSTRACT

Alternate Military Strategy for the War on Terrorism calls for addressing the war as a global insurgency. Addressing the war on terrorism as a Global Insurgency provides an alternative strategic framework for prosecuting the campaign. This study is not intended to resolve the debate over whether the war on terrorism is an insurgency or not. Instead, it bypasses the debate to determine the utility of addressing the war on terrorism using an insurgency/counterinsurgency conceptual framework. Additionally, the recommendations from the analysis can be applied to strategic campaign planning, even if it is determined to be politically unfeasible to address the war as an insurgency.

The study is broken down into five chapters: an introduction, explanation of Dr. McCormick's Counterinsurgency model used for analysis, application of the model to a historical case, application to the war on terrorism, and conclusions. The first half of the study is intended to provide a thorough understanding of Dr. McCormick's model. This is done by, first, providing an overview of the model and, second, applying the model to a historical case: the insurgency in Lebanon following the Israeli invasion in 1982. The second half of the study addresses the current U.S. lead war on terrorism. The counterinsurgency model is applied to the war on terrorism based on the al Qaeda Network and the United States' vision and mission for the conflict. Ten recommendations for restructuring the U.S. strategic framework for approaching the war on terrorism are drawn from the analysis. The final chapter addresses the utility provided by the insurgency/counterinsurgency framework as applied to the war on terrorism.

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I. INTRODUCTION

There is no worse lie than a truth misunderstood by those who hear it.

William James

A. PURPOSE

The purpose of this study is to provide an alternative approach for analyzing the war on terrorism. As Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow state in *Essence of Decision*:

Alternative conceptual frameworks are important not only for further insights into neglected dimensions of the underlying phenomenon. They are essential as a reminder of the distortions and limitations of whatever conceptual framework one employs.¹

Only by analyzing a phenomenon from an alternative perspective (preferably multiple alternative perspectives) can all the intricacies of a situation be understood. This study will address one of the many alternative methods for analyzing the war on terrorism, in this case as a Global Insurgency.

B. THESIS STATEMENT

Addressing the war on terrorism as a Global Insurgency will provide an alternative strategic framework for prosecuting the campaign. This study is not intended to resolve the debate over whether the war on terrorism is an insurgency or not. Instead it is meant to bypass the debate and determine the utility of addressing the war on terrorism utilizing an insurgency/counterinsurgency conceptual framework. Additionally, it may be politically unfeasible to address the war on terrorism as a global insurgency, but the counterinsurgency framework is still applicable for strategic campaign planning.

C. PRELUDE TO INDIVIDUAL CHAPTERS

1. Chapter II - The Counterinsurgency Model

Dr. Gordon McCormick's counterinsurgency (COIN) model² is used to analyze the war on terrorism. The model develops a symmetric view of the required strategic focus for both the insurgent and COIN forces to achieve success. In this way the COIN

¹ Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2d Ed. (New York: Longman, 1999), 8.

² Dr. Gordon McCormick is currently the Chair of the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey California. The Defense Analysis Department provides a Special Operations oriented curriculum sponsored by U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

model demonstrates how both the insurgent and COIN forces succeed or fail. The model is broken down into five strategies available to the insurgent and COIN forces; with one overarching principal for the application of these strategies. This chapter explains the model that is then applied to a historical case study and the war on terrorism.

2. Chapter III - Hizballah: Examination of a Successful Insurgency

The COIN Model is applied to the insurgency in Lebanon following the 6 June 1982 invasion of Israeli forces into southern Lebanon. This case study was selected primarily because of the influence Hizballah has had on Radical Islamist ideology and tactics. The removal of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) from southern Lebanon proved to the people of the Middle East that Israel could be defeated. Hizballah's campaign provided a strategic and tactical framework for numerically weaker forces to counter organized conventional units. This chapter analyzes the actions of both Hizballah and the IDF using Dr. McCormick's COIN Model drawing conclusions from the analysis on the successes and failures of the two opposing forces. The chapter also provides the analysis of a historical case study to illustrate the strategies and overarching principal of the model.

3. Chapter IV - Global Insurgency

This chapter will address the war on terrorism from the perspective of a global insurgency. The main assumption is that the dynamics of the global insurgency parallel an intra-state insurgency. Therefore, the tools utilized to analyze an intra-state insurgency will apply to the global insurgency. The analysis is based on al Qaeda and the United States' vision and mission for the current conflict. Ten recommendations for restructuring the U.S. strategic framework for approaching the war on terrorism are drawn from the analysis.

4. Chapter V - Conclusions

The final chapter addresses the utility of applying Dr. McCormick's model to the Global Insurgency. The primary conclusion drawn from the analysis is that a shift in the main emphasis for the conduct of the war is needed. The primary emphasis must shift to, and remain on, the population. Rather than going after the network directly, the McCormick Model analysis points to the need to target the network's support base and resources as the most effective method of defeating

the AQN. Gaining popular support strengthens the Coalition's ability to counter the AQN, while simultaneously draining the network of their ability to operate; their most basic and essential *needs* go unfulfilled and the network will fail to retain a global influence.

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II. THE COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL

The guerrilla's operational challenge is, first, to provide the spark that sets the conflict in motion and, second, to serve as a conduit to channel the population's revolutionary sentiments.

Gordon H. McCormick³

A. MCCORMICK'S COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL

Dr. Gordon McCormick's model is designed as a tool for counterinsurgency (COIN), but develops a symmetrical view of the required actions for both the Insurgent and COIN forces to achieve success. In this way the counterinsurgency model can demonstrate how both the insurgent and COIN forces succeed or fail. The model's strategies and principle apply to both forces, therefore the degree the forces follow the model should have a direct correlation to the success or failure of either the Insurgent or COIN force. The model was initially developed based in Dr. McCormick's extensive studies in insurgency and specifically on his experiences in Peru studying the conflict between the Peruvian Government and Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path).

The model depicts four key elements or players (described in section B below). There are also five mirrored strategies (described in section C below) available to both the IF and CF, as well as feedback mechanisms (described in section D below) for those forces. Figure 1 is a graphical representation of the model. Not depicted is the guiding principle for the application of the five strategies (described in section E below).

B. THE PLAYERS

1. The Insurgent Force

The Insurgent Force (IF) is the group (individuals through "force in being", depending on the time line of the insurgency) conducting or supporting operations to remove the current government or occupying force. Insurgents are anyone that is either actively or passively supporting the insurgent movement; including, but not limited to, the active fighters, supporting clandestine infrastructure (leadership, auxiliary,

³ Gordon H. McCormick, "People's War," in James Ciment (ed), *The Encyclopedia of International Conflict*, Shoken Press, 1999.

underground), paramilitary forces, and trainers/advisors. There is not always a clear distinction between the voluntary insurgent and those coerced into supporting the IF.




Figure 1. McCormick's Counterinsurgency Model (From: McCormick, 2003, Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA)

Distinguishing between the voluntary insurgent, the coerced supporter, and the innocent bystander is one of the most difficult obstacles (if not the most difficult) for the COIN force. "They [insurgents] typically have sources of support among the local populace of the same ethnicity with whom their separatist goals (or appeals to blood links) may resonate."⁴ Analysis using this model is applied to one central Insurgent Force and their countering COIN Force, but includes each group's interaction with any potential supporting, rival, or competing insurgent/COIN forces. An insurgent movement does not need to follow any specific ideology (Marxist/Leninist, Maoist, Democratic, Religious...), but the members must have similar ideologies and/or objectives, and follow the same leadership to be considered a single organization. Often multiple organizations will be

⁴Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," *International Security* 27 (2003): 30-58.

involved in an insurgency, but different organizations are distinct in their beliefs, actions, leadership, and/or desired endstate. For example, during the Cuban Revolution there were multiple organizations (Directorio Revolucionario, M-26-7, ANR, AAA...) all working to remove Batista from power, but each had their own independent view of how Cuba should look after the revolution.

2. The Counterinsurgency Force

The counterinsurgency force (CF) is the current government or occupying force in the region. These are the forces on the ground that are in direct combat with the IF. There is normally a single force that is the lead in the COIN effort, but other troops, organizations, or countries can provide additional forces to augment the CF. The CF must integrate all elements of national power: civil, military, diplomatic, informational, economic, and financial capabilities. These forces include, but are not limited to: military, police, security forces, intelligence infrastructure, and trainers/advisors. The CF is defined by the insurgent's perceptions; if forces are present that believe they are not taking an active role in the COIN effort (i.e. peacekeepers or observers), but are perceived by the IF as influencing the situation, then those forces have become part of the CF. The corollary is true of the CF defining the IF, but the CF normally has a greater "burden of proof" dictated by the media and international oversight. The CF must clearly identify legitimate targets among insurgents that can often blend in with the local populace, while the IF can easily identify conventional COIN Forces by their large and obvious signature (uniforms, bases, vehicles...).

3. The Population

The Population consists of the non-combatants in the disputed region. While support may be coerced out of the Population they are not considered insurgents until they provide additional support beyond that required to avoid reprisals. For example, during the War in El Salvador the insurgents (and often government forces too) required water and tortillas from the Population. Failure to provide this subsistence support was deemed to indicate affiliation with the opponent and would result in immediate reprisals. The people that provided this support were not considered combatants (pro-insurgent or pro-government) until support was provided above (more than water and tortillas) or below (not even water and tortillas) the base level. When the people provide information,

early warning, take up arms, or any other form of active or passive support, they are choosing a side and are no longer non-combatants or members of the population.

4. The International Community

The International Community is made up of external nation states, international organizations, and other groups that are not functioning in a direct or indirect support role for the IF or CF. Members of the International Community, similar to the population, remain “neutral” until they provide support to a side; once support is provided (or perceived to be provided) they become part of the IF or CF. The International Community can introduce troops into a region without choosing sides, for example peacekeeping forces, and thus retain non-combatant status as long as their presence does not construe support for the IF or CF. Maintaining the perception of neutrality can be a difficult task and members of the International Community can transition from external supporter to participant either intentionally or unknowingly. For example, the Pakistani Military in Somalia was under the auspices of UN Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance; while providing food to starving Somalis. The UN forces viewed this as a neutral act which provided them sanctuary from attack. The Somali warlord, Mohamed Farrah Aidid, viewed the distribution of food as a threat to his control over the population and ordered an ambush of a UN convoy killing 18 Pakistani soldiers. The IF perception of the UN had shifted. The UN Peacekeepers showed an influence that was not directed against the IF, but did have the indirect effect of undermining the IF authority and control. This perceived influence in the eyes of the IF made the peacekeepers members of the CF and legitimate targets.

C. THE STRATEGIES

1. Strategy 1 – Gaining Support of the Population

Strategy 1 is directed at gaining the support of the population. The battle for popular support is critical during an insurgency; both the IF and CF need popular support for success. The asymmetry of insurgent warfare derives from the forces’ different strengths and weaknesses, these differences - and thus *needs* - drive how the forces apply this strategy. The insurgent force often has the initial advantage in popular support over the COIN force because the insurgent traditionally comes from or claims to be fighting for the Population.

Although the CF is strong in resources, personnel, and firepower, they normally lack specific intelligence on the IF. Therefore, the CF *needs* popular support to gain the required intelligence to identify the IF and generate legitimate targets that support the overall campaign plan. Indiscriminant assaults will cause collateral damage that will degrade popular support.

Conversely, the IF can easily identify their opponent, but comparatively lack resources, personnel, and firepower. The IF *needs* popular support to increase their resources and personnel, but more importantly their security. The most valuable asset the population can provide is the security to move freely within the region - thus denying the CF its essential *need* for intelligence. The population's passive support gives the insurgent early warning of approaching COIN forces, providing time to hide or escape. This allows the insurgents the freedom to plan and conduct operations, and more importantly *survive*. Active support is only a secondary contribution of the population. This can be seen in interviews of locals and IF members following the insurgency in El Salvador:

While the provision of supplies and the movement of ordinance were important, the provision of military intelligence concerning the movement of government forces was the essential *campesino* contribution.⁵

A small insurgency can sustain operations with the passive support of the population, allowing the organization to then focus on recruiting active supporters and increasing its size.

Both the IF and CF fill different *needs* through popular support. The population has the ability to neutralize the strengths and weaknesses between the IF and CF. While these are significant contributions necessary to both forces, the most important contribution the population can provide is legitimacy of action. Both the IF and CF require popular support to maintain the perceived legitimacy. Legitimacy cannot be made it can only be granted by the population and international community. The goal of the CF is to deny legitimacy to the IF (discrediting IF actions or underlying ideology as illegitimate), while maintaining its control. The IF is attempting to diminish the CF

⁵ Elisabeth Jean Wood, *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 121.

legitimacy (either through provoking a military response, propaganda, demonstrating inability to provide security to the population, or other ways of undermining control), while establishing the legitimacy of its cause. “An insurgent movement is a war for the people,”⁶ because the people provide legitimacy for the group they support.

2. Strategy 2 - Disrupt Opponent’s Control Over the Population

Strategy 2 is directed at disrupting the opponent’s control over the Population. Where Strategy 1 focuses primarily on gaining popular support, Strategy 2 focuses on preventing or interrupting your opponent’s control over the Population. Strategy 1 is an attempt to actively gain support; Strategy 2 is more reactive or preemptive to deny support to the opponent. The CF objective is to drive a wedge between the IF and the population they rely on, by de-legitimizing the IF and denying it access to the population and other resources in the operational area. Conversely, the IF must attempt to de-legitimize the authority of the current government and break/disrupt the control the CF has over the population and the resources the IF depends on for survival and success. Attempts at (or lack of) Strategy 1 can have implications on a force’s ability to execute Strategy 2.

The IF has the advantage in Strategy 2. The CF, in order to maintain legitimacy, must destroy the IF. The IF only needs to survive to undermine the perceived control of the CF, and thus undermine its legitimacy. As Michael Vlahos states:

While the established and legitimate [Government] must have as their goal the destruction of the insurgent movement, the insurgency needs only to survive to deny the established authority its goal. An establishment that cannot put down a direct challenge to its authority...is increasingly discredited... The longer they [the insurgent] survive the more their authority grows, and the weaker the strategic position of the establishment becomes.⁷

The information war and perception management can be a critical aspect of Strategy 2. Both the IF and CF should use and exploit the media as an “information age” force multiplier to gain support and spread the justification behind the forces actions. To paraphrase Rohan Gunaratna in his article *Defeating Al Qaeda*: Instead of shying away,

⁶ Sir Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966), 51.

⁷ Michael Vlahos, *Terror’s Mask: Insurgency within Islam*, (Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins University Joint Warfare Analysis Department, 2002), 4.

public diplomacy must be used to develop transparency and accountability.⁸ Both sides can use the media and public diplomacy to gain support (Strategy 1) and to deny support to the opponent (Strategy 2).

3. Strategy 3 - Direct Action Against Opponent

Strategy 3 is directed at striking the opponent to disrupt his operations, attrit his forces, and break his will to continue the struggle. Effective use of Strategy 3 is limited by the degree of knowledge and understanding of the opponent. The conventional CF's large and obvious signature means the IF can easily identify the CF activities and locations. This knowledge enables the IF to conduct assaults when and where they choose reducing the fear of collateral damage. The CF on the other hand has to first gain necessary intelligence before it can conduct effective operations. The IF defense against Strategy 3 is secrecy, denying the CF the ability to find and fix the insurgents. The CF traditionally has ample capabilities to conduct direct assaults, but is limited by the availability of legitimate targets. As previously discussed, indiscriminant assaults can be counterproductive to the overall COIN effort. Conversely the CF is protected by strength and firepower, while the IF lacks the capabilities and size to deliver a decisive victory in a single blow.

4. Strategy 4 - Disrupt Opponent's Relations with the International Community

Strategy 4 is the corollary to Strategy 2 as applied to the International Community. This strategy focuses on denying the opponent international support. As in Strategy 2, the CF objective is to drive a wedge between the IF and the International Community. Similarly, the IF must attempt to disrupt any international support for the government or occupying force. Both Forces require perceived legitimacy in order to obtain international support.

5. Strategy 5 - Establish Relationships with the International Community

Most conflicts, including civil wars, become battles for legitimacy and strong international backing can provide perceived legitimacy. Outside of gaining nation-state support, international support can serve to level the strengths and weaknesses between

⁸ Rohan Gunaratna, "Defeating Al Qaeda," in *Defeating Terrorism: Shaping the new Security Environment*, ed. Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer (Guilford: McGraw-Hill Companies, 2004), 1-28.

the CF and IF. The CF, with a firepower and troop strength advantage, is primarily concerned with nation-state support to gain legitimacy. The IF can gain critical resources, training, and personnel from international support, whether from foreign governments, expatriates, or other external organizations. The IF can also use international organizations to force further restrictions on the current government or occupying force. For example the IF can manipulate Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) to ensure COIN Forces follow international agreements concerning human rights, while the IF (being a non-state actor) does not receive similar oversight.

D. FEEDBACK

Feedback is critical for understanding the effects of IF and CF actions on popular and international perceptions. The feedback connections allow both forces to assess the success or failure of their operations. A military operation conducted flawlessly that only heightens animosity among the population, is an unsuccessful operation. Forces must analyze the effects of their actions, and those of their opponents, and remain flexible enough to adjust operations to maximize friendly effects and minimize those of the opponent. This may be initially easier for the IF because it traditionally is closely tied to population, but both sides must establish and maintain feedback mechanisms to assess their operations.

E. THE PRINCIPLE BEHIND THE MODEL

The driving principle behind the model is that both forces, IF and CF, must conduct every operation with consideration of how it will affect perceptions in the population and international community. Following this principle, both forces must execute the strategies from the outside in; meaning that the main emphasis must be on Strategies 1 and 5. Only by focusing on strategies 1 & 5 (gaining the support of the population and international community) can the required *needs* be addressed to effectively execute the other strategies. This does not mean, for example, that direct action (Strategy 3) cannot be used, what it does mean is that direct action can only be used when it promises to produce a net benefit in popular and/or international support. The CF and IF will utilize all five Strategies to varying degrees throughout the conflict, but the center of gravity is primarily the population.

The IF may be forced in the initial stages to utilize a strictly direct action campaign. Direct action by the IF shows the population that the insurgency exists, demonstrates that the CF can be resisted, produces the necessary attention required to then allow recruitment and expansion, and/or to force the CF to further alienate the population through operations conducted in the name of security/control. A small insurgent force can maintain a strictly Strategy 3 focus, but it will never win the war. Sustained small attacks may preoccupy the government or occupying force, but without the population's backing the insurgency will never seriously threaten the legitimacy or control of the CF. The CF must also focus on popular support, because without it the region will require a permanent military/police presence. If the CF does not gain popular support, the insurgents will remain active. The best case scenario for the CF in this situation would be to maintain a permanent presence in the region, the worst case is that the IF discovers the strength of popular support and eventually grows until they achieve the strength required to remove the government or occupying force.

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III. HIZBALLAH⁹: EXAMINATION OF A SUCCESSFUL INSURGENCY

The only way to fight a counterinsurgency is by “unconventional war”

Where rank disappears and function takes over, the military is working efficiently. Where function disappears and rank takes over the military is not working at all.

Robert Kaplan¹⁰

A. INSURGENCY IN LEBANON

If you mention the name Hizballah to most Americans, the suicide bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut is a common image. There is a great deal of anti-western ideology exemplified in this common image, but once you get passed any cultural bias and take an objective look at Hizballah, you see a successful insurgent group that fought and defeated a far stronger professional military in Lebanon. Without justifying, excusing, or defending Hizballah’s tactics, it cannot be denied that Hizballah achieved a great deal while influencing the situation in Lebanon. Hizballah began as a small radical splinter group and evolved into not only a locally respected militia but also a legitimate political party in Lebanon. This analysis will attempt to determine if Hizballah’s emergence as a social and political power was the result of random historic events or a well-planned insurgent movement that achieved success by applying the basic fundamentals of insurgency.

The situation in Lebanon will be analyzed primarily from the early 1980’s through the early 1990’s utilizing Dr. McCormick’s counterinsurgency model. These were the formative years for Hizballah; it was during this period that the organization went from small splinter groups to force in being to political party. First will be an account of key activities of the parties involved. Activities will then be analyzed using the model and the chapter will finish with conclusions drawn from the analysis. The analysis will be primarily from “the people’s” perspective, bypassing some of the

⁹ The English spelling of Hizballah is varied from author to author, for consistency’s sake the spelling used will be “Hizballah” unless it is used as part of a direct quote.

¹⁰ Robert Kaplan, “The Global Security Situation in 2010 and How the Military Must Evolve to Deal with it,” speech given at the Marine Memorial Hotel, San Francisco, January 2004.

significant International activities being conducted. For example, the assassination of Bashir Gemayel and subsequent collapse of the Israeli plan for the Lebanese government had significant international impact, but is not covered in depth.¹¹ Gemayel's assassination was a significant event in the history of Lebanon and had strategic implications on Israel's "big plan." While the international strategic implications of the assassination were important, their direct effects were removed from the driving forces behind the insurgency and therefore are not discussed in detail. The analysis reveals that the success of Hizballah was the result of a properly executed insurgency.

1. Historical Background

In 1967 Israel occupied the Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights of Syria. While this did not directly affect Lebanon, it did affect opinions throughout the Arab world. The Arab response was to initiate conventional operations against Israel led by Egypt from 1967-71, generally referred to as the "war of attrition." These operations failed to displace the Israelis and shaped an impression of invincibility around the IDF.

In September of 1970, King Hussein's Jordanian forces confronted the large number of Palestinians occupying western Jordan forcing many of the Palestinians out of the country. Many of the Palestinians fled to Lebanon where the resultant influx of Palestinian fighters, along with the earlier creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), contributed to increased unrest. Lebanon became the focal point for Palestinian attacks on Israel and subsequent Israeli retaliations. The main forces in the unrest were Muslims backed by the PLO and Iran, fighting Christians backed by the Israelis. Syria initially supported the Christian forces with the intent of preventing any one group from dominating Lebanon and thereby threatening Syria's interests in the country. Syria and Israel both intervened openly and opposingly in the conflict to protect their interests, in contrast to previously conducting

¹¹ Bashir Gemayel was the President of Lebanon. The Israelis formed an alliance with his Phalange government prior to the Invasion of Lebanon. The Israeli's reinforced the control of the Phalange government, and thus Gemayel. In return the Phalange would support the destruction/removal of the PLO and sign a Peace Treaty with Israel. Gemayel was re-elected president in Lebanon's August Presidential elections with the help of Israel. On 14 September, Gemayel was assassinated prior to any agreements being solidified with Israel. Gemayel's assassination removed the key figure in Israel's "big plan" and changed Israel's policy in Lebanon.

operations through their respective surrogate forces. In 1982, the Israelis invaded Lebanon and expelled the leadership of the PLO. It is this invasion that lead directly to the formation of Hizballah.¹²

The majority of Hizballah's initial supporters were disillusioned members of Afwaj al-Muqawamah al-Lubnaniya (Legions of the Lebanese Resistance) better known as AMAL (Amal). Hizballah supporters objected to Amal's, and Amal's then leader Nabih Berri's, moderate policies and presumed willingness to pursue political solutions rather than military confrontations to Israel's invasion. Hizballah also had ties with various other Shiite groups in Lebanon and received ideological leadership from Iran, and specifically Ayatollah Khomeini.

2. Hizballah's Vision and Mission

The core of Hizballah's ideology comes from the teachings of two Muslim religious leaders, Iraq's Baqir al-Sadr and Iran's Ruhallah Khomeini. Baqir al-Sadr organized Muslim believers to seize power and create an Islamic State to spread to the rest of the world. From Ruhallah Khomeini, the late Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran, the organization embraced Iran's Islamic revolution and adopted the idea that a religious jurist (*valat-i faqih*) should hold ultimate political power derived from sharia (Islamic law). In 1982, while Hizballah was still in its infancy, the supporters were "devout Muslims, disillusioned by the established parties' political ideology and intent on going back to basics by creating an entity which would conform to Islamic sharia, Islamic law, and the word of the Almighty Allah."¹³

Hizballah's goals, as stated by the Department of State in *Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003*, are the liberation of Jerusalem, elimination of Israel, and ultimately the establishment of Islamic Rule in Lebanon. In Hizballah's manifesto, issued in 1985, they declared their political agenda. Hizballah "vowed never to participate in any of the [Lebanese] government's institutions, so long as the 'current decaying sectarian system' exists, emphasizing that no measure of reform would be considered sufficient."¹⁴ The

¹² Sami. Hajjar, *Hizballah: Terrorism, National Liberation or Menace?* (Strategic Studies Institute: U.S. Army War College, 2002), 2-3.

¹³ Hala Jaber, *Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1997), 48.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 61.

manifesto was worded skillfully to appeal to the greatest number of potential supporters. “We do not seek to impose Islam on anyone as we hate those who impose their beliefs and regimes on us and we do not want Islam to reign Lebanon by force.”¹⁵ The organization was appealing to the mass support that self determination could bring. The stated primary objective was to achieve a position where free choice could be had. Hizballah felt the people would embrace wisdom of Islam, as an ideology and system, and propel the organization to the forefront of the new Islamic state.

3. Israel’s Vision and Mission¹⁶

Ariel Sharon, then Defense Minister of Israel, developed the “big plan” for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The first aim of the plan was to destroy the PLO’s political infrastructure in Lebanon. The second aim which was a prerequisite for the third was to expel Syrian forces from Lebanon or at least undermine Syria’s influence in the country. The third aim was to establish a government in Lebanon that would sign a peace treaty with Israel, through establishing Christian Maronite leadership in the country. The invasion of Lebanon and destruction of the PLO would have the effect of changing the political order not only in Lebanon, but in the Middle East. The destruction of the PLO would break the Palestinians hold in the region and allow permanent Israeli control of the West Bank.¹⁷

The initial months after the 1982 invasion did not see much resistance against the Israelis in the south, despite the brutal but effective tactics of the Israelis throughout Lebanon. Amal, the main Shiite representative organization at the time, had taken a moderate stance and the “southerners even felt a certain affinity with the invaders.”¹⁸ The PLO had been a powerful force in the south and was accused of corruption and abuses that alienated the local population. The PLO abuses initiated open conflict between Amal and the PLO in the spring of 1982, prior to the Israeli Invasion. The southern population was happy to see the oppressive PLO removed, even though the liberation was brought by Israel. The southern population accepted the Israeli forces

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ This is Israel’s Vision and Mission concerning the invasion of Lebanon in 1982.

¹⁷ Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 396.

¹⁸ Jaber, 14.

because they shared the same desired outcome, the removal of the PLO. The Israeli's seized the opportunity while Shiite and Palestinian relations were low. The PLO's removal also allowed refugees to return to their villages. The assumption was made, incorrectly, that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) would be gone in a few months. As the occupation wore on, and the IDF established additional population controls, it became apparent that the liberating force was becoming an occupation force.

4. Birth of the Insurgency

The Israelis began to impose controls on the population in attempts to halt the developing insurgency. The IDF formed militias through an alliance with Lebanese Christian Maronites. The militia forces were called the National Guard and were armed and trained by Israel. This could have been an ideal mechanism to establish a unified and legitimate regional security force, but it became apparent that the National Guard's primary role was to protect Israel, not the local population. The IDF used coercion - threatening reprisals on relatives held by the Israelis - to force families to support the militias. Israel, during their occupation, focused on direct action and intimidation to quell the developing insurgency. This was against suggestions of some Israeli officers who had recommended fostering a relationship with the Shiites.¹⁹ Instead the Israelis alienated the predominantly Shiite population, resulting in the insurgent movement.

Turning a blind eye to Israel's trespass on their land for the sake of the common aim of expelling the PLO was one thing, but becoming their surrogates and allowing the Israeli domination of their lives and territory was totally unacceptable to the Shiites.²⁰

The insurgency was initially unorganized; it consisted of small scale protests, boycotts of Israeli products, and nuisance attacks against the IDF. The Lebanese National Resistance was formed which was primarily made up of Amal members. Hizballah's existence became evident when pictures of the Ayatollah Khomeini started to appear in areas with a strong Hizballah influence; indicating an Islamic group influenced by Iran, rather than the secular Amal. Hizballah had not declared itself as an organization at this point and continued to fight under the banner of the LNR [Lebanese National Resistance]. The organization remained very secretive and "sympathizers who remained

¹⁹ Ibid., 15.

²⁰ Jaber, 15-16.

within the ranks of Amal were encouraged not to defect ... and were urged to work on transforming the Shiite movement from within.”²¹ Hizballah operated on multiple fronts to improve the organization, while recruits were being trained, the leaders were developing the organization’s future structure, and clerics preached tirelessly to spread the word of the Islamic movement. The quiet emergence of Hizballah signified a battle for Shiite support between the established Amal and the developing Hizballah.

Israel continued to show no consideration for Shiites affairs. An incident in 1983 proved to be the tipping point. An Israeli convoy arrived at the sight of a significant Shiite religious ceremony attended by 50,000 southern Lebanese;²² rather than accommodating the Lebanese, the Israeli commander insisted on driving through the ceremony. This offended the Lebanese who reacted furiously to the intrusion. Israeli troops caught in the midst of the riot called for reinforcements and began shooting, killing two Shiites. Sheikh Mehdi Shamseddin subsequently issued the first *fatwa* against the Israeli occupiers calling for “civil disobedience”. Civil disobedience rapidly escalated into violence. Each Lebanese attack was met with Israeli intensification of the “harsh campaign of repression against the residents.”²³

The IDF, in an attempt to prevent further infiltration of insurgent fighters into the southern region, established a cordon that isolated the southern population, providing only one point of entry/exit between the south and the rest of the country. This was an attempt to prevent the infiltration of insurgents into the region, but also served to disrupt the economy of the South. The southern population relied on the sale of fruit and vegetables for their livelihood. The farmers could only watch as their produce spoiled while waiting to pass through the single entry/exit point. This treatment served to further emphasize the IDF as an occupation force. The southern population felt they had traded one oppressor – the PLO – for another – the IDF.

The IDF lack of intelligence on the insurgents, and complete lack of popular support to garner that intelligence, led to mass reprisals on the southern population. The

²¹ Ibid., 54.

²² The religious ceremony was “the Ashura commemoration of the death of Husayn - the most important and impassioned religious ritual in Shi’ism” Glenn Robinson, email to author, 5 November 2004.

²³ Ibid., 19

Israelis began to arrest anyone suspected of supporting the insurgents under the “Iron Fist” plan of occupation. The IDF’s situation was rapidly spiraling out of control; rather than coercing the population to fear supporting the insurgents, the indiscriminant arrests were driving supporters to the insurgency faster than the IDF was able to detain them.

5. International Influences

a. Iran and Syria’s Support to Hizballah

Hizballah’s image as the surrogate for the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary was reinforced with the 1982 arrival of Iranian Revolutionary Guards in the Bekaa Valley. The Iranians were sent to train and advise Hizballah on how to organize and conduct military operations. The Bekaa Valley was used as the main base for Hizballah, which was outside of Amal’s traditional power base. This allowed Hizballah to postpone the conflict with Amal for southern Shiite support. The valley was also outside of the IDF’s area of control. The safe haven provided Hizballah an area to conduct recruitment, organization, and training without interference. Another benefit was that the valley bordered along Syria providing an unobstructed infiltration route for weapons and ammunition from the organization’s Iranian support base.

b. The United Nations Multinational Force

The United Nations Multinational Force (UNMNF) arrived in Lebanon in August 1982. On 16 September, 1982, Christian militiamen seeking revenge for the assassination of President Bashir Gemayel, killed hundreds of unarmed men, women, and children in the Shiite Camps of Sabra and Chatila. This massacre occurred with the knowledge and assistance of the IDF, and caused President Reagan to escalate the U.S. forces role. The U.S. portion of the UNMNF’s new mission was “to establish an environment which will permit the Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut area.”²⁴

The fighting in the country had intensified. Clashes between the Lebanese Army and Druze forces escalated around Beirut.²⁵ The U.S. forces provided the

²⁴ Department of Defense, “Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act,” 35, <http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AMH/XX/MidEast/Lebanon-1982-1984/DOD-Report/Beirut-1.html#page40>

²⁵ There were multiple groups vying for power in Lebanon. The primary participants were: 1) The Phalange government which was primarily Christian and maintained power in and around Beirut. 2) Sunni Muslims living primarily in urban areas. 3) Shiite Muslims, who were the lower class workers in Lebanon,

Lebanese Army supplies in an attempt to reinforce the Lebanese Government. U.S. Marines and Naval warships intervened, shelling Druze and Syrian targets. The U.S. forces had chosen sides in the war in an attempt to maintain the Phalange Government, thus violating the UNMNF neutrality. The U.S. and French barracks were bombed the following month. According to the Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act,

The image of the USMNF, in the eyes of the factional militias, had become pro-Israel, pro-Phalange, and anti-Muslim. After the USMNF engaged in direct fire support of the LAF [Lebanese Armed Forces], a significant portion of the Lebanese populace no longer considered the USMNF a neutral force.²⁶

The Multinational Forces had shifted from members of the International Community to active participants on behalf of the COIN Force in the eyes of the Lebanese population.

6. Hizballah's Military Branch

Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the bombings of the MNF barracks which killed 241 U.S. and 58 French personnel. This new group was linked to Hizballah as a new radical counterpart to the organization's more conventional military branch, the Islamic Resistance. Hizballah's military organization had taken shape, and "the substantial salaries and benefits reportedly paid by Hizballah to its fighters encouraged rapid growth of the military wing."²⁷

Hizballah's military wing continued to grow, but the continued fighting was beginning to affect Hizballah's popular support. The southern population was accustomed to insurgent fighting and provided active and passive support for the movement. Popular discontent for the insurgents arose out of the casualties, Israeli reprisals, and continued deterioration of quality of life. Waning confidence signified a significant crisis for the insurgents attempting to capture Shiite popular support, Hizballah and Amal.

living primarily in the rural areas of the south and the Biqu'a Valley, a large Shiite community was later established in the southern suburbs of Beirut made up of refugees following the Israeli invasion in the south. The Shiites traditionally had no representation in the government.

²⁶ DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport, 40-41.

²⁷ Judith Harik, *The Public and Social Services of the Lebanese Militias* (Oxford: The Center for Lebanese Studies, 1994), 25.

7. The Birth of Public and Social Services

Hizballah and Amal had to demonstrate to the Population that continued support would eventually lead to a better life and that the insurgents' objectives benefited the Population. The insurgent forces needed to adjust operations to accommodate their critical popular support base, while continuing the struggle with the IDF. Hizballah, with their substantial Iranian support, was better suited to expand into the new role of service provider. The popular support base had to be maintained simultaneously, because military resistance could not and did not stop. Hizballah initiated their public and social services initiatives with the introduction of hospitals and medical care. "The Islamic health [committee] was established in 1984 and Reconstruction Campaign (jihad al-bina') ... was created in 1988."²⁸ The Reconst. Campaign (RC) became Hizballah's public and social services branch.




Figure 2. Hizballah Organization Chart (After: Hajjar, 2002, p.8-10; Hamzeh, 1993, p. 325-328; and the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center)

²⁸ Ibid., 26.

The RC was dedicated to providing services to the Shiite community that the Lebanese Government failed to supply. As can be seen in Figure 2 above, the RC eventually expanded to encompass all aspects of the population's service needs. The RC became the primary supplier of infrastructure support to the Shiite community in and around Beirut. The Lebanese Government historically distributed services based on community allegiance. This meant that Maronite Christian communities received the majority of the government services and Shiite communities, who had less influential government representation, received very little. Each group - Druze, Christian, and Shiite - was forced to establish service organizations to cater to their respective support bases to make up for government short comings. Hizballah's initial efforts were to provide the basic essentials of life: food, water, shelter, and medical assistance. The RC operations expanded to include infrastructure development, agricultural reform, financial support, and other services normally provided by the government. Hizballah's greatest asset for developing popular support became its "steady, patient, reliable work in a country with a government of big talk and little action."²⁹ Amal's support continued to be strong in the South, but Amal's service organization was relatively small when compared to Hizballah's and other organizations'. The Iranian support for Hizballah enabled the RC to provide a broader amount of social services and in larger quantities, which slowly undermined Amal's support base. Amal and Hizballah had different visions of how to achieve change in Lebanon which distinguished the two organizations. Amal was a reform party seeking to maximize Shiite benefits within the existing system. Hizballah was a revolutionary party seeking to change the system entirely, at least early on.

B. APPLICATION OF MCCORMICK'S MODEL

1. The Players

a. The Insurgent Force

The focus in this case study is primarily Hizballah (Party of God), but also includes their interaction with other insurgent forces in the area with similar goals. In southern Lebanon the main "rival" insurgent group competing for popular support (mainly from within the Shiite community) and legitimacy was Amal. Amal was seeking

²⁹ Harik, *Public and Social Services*, 53.

political secularization and improvement of the political system. Hizballah was seeking the establishment of Islamic authority in Lebanon through military conflict.

b. The COIN Force

The IDF is the primary COIN force in this case study. Israel's efforts were assisted by their surrogates consisting of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the National Guard they created (primarily Christian forces). The IDF, as opposed to the Lebanese Army, is the primary COIN force because the Israelis were the force that "controlled" southern Lebanon. While the Shiite's desired representation in the Lebanese government, the foremost threat for the insurgents was the presence of Israeli forces in Southern Lebanon. Only after the removal of the IDF could Hizballah attempt to influence Lebanese politics. This makes the IDF and their surrogates the primary targets of the insurgent force and subsequently the primary COIN force.

c. The Population

The population is made up of the residents of Lebanon. The primary focus is on the residents of Southern Lebanon. The population is made up of individuals/groups/communities whose popular opinion can influence the insurgency; this would include Lebanese residents outside the embattled southern region, as well as the Israeli population's opinion of the IDF operations.

d. The International Community

The primary participants of the International Community were Iran, Syria, and the UNMNF (primarily the U.S. and French Forces).

2. Strategic Analysis

The CF and IF both started by focusing on direct action, with similar results. The IDF received initial popular support by removing the PLO, but this initial elation waned when it became apparent the IDF was becoming an occupation force that placed Israel's desires over the "liberated" population. The "Iron Fist" policy of heavy handed control measures further alienated the Population. The IF went through the same cycle as the IDF. Initially the insurgents' direct action gained them popular support by demonstrating that someone was fighting for the population's interests and standing up to the current oppressive occupiers. The role of oppressor had shifted from the PLO to the IDF, and the role of liberator had shifted from the IDF to the insurgents. The insurgents also began to

lose popular support – like the IDF had – mainly due to the lack of improvements in the population’s quality of life. Hizballah’s enforcement of strict Islamic law also revived past feelings of repression.

a. Strategy 1 - Struggle for Support of the Population

Israel failed to focus on the Population as a center of gravity for the counterinsurgency. The IDF’s solution to counter deteriorating popular support was to increase assaults (Strategy 3) and population controls designed to separate the insurgents from the Population (Strategy 2). Research does not indicate the implementation of any IDF programs to gain popular support (Strategy 1); instead the focus was “a war to remove once and for all the threat hanging over the Galilee.”³⁰ Israel did not want to establish a unified security zone; they wanted to remove any threat to Galilee by expanding their border. The southern population of Lebanon was viewed as a target, never a potential asset, and Israel’s plan never included attempts to win the Population’s support (Strategy 1). If the Israelis had adopted combined control over the Population (Lebanese & Israeli) and succeeded in establishing an alliance with the Shiites, they could have integrated the southern population as valuable allies to secure the border.

The IDF was caught in a deadly yet predictable spiral; the more they alienated the Population, the less intelligence they could gather. Diminishing intelligence on the insurgents reduced the availability of discriminate targets for operations. The IDF transitioned to mass reprisals causing further alienation of the Population. Indiscriminate attacks affected both the insurgent and the Population, creating greater sympathy for the insurgent movement. The effects of assaults on discriminate targets are limited to the insurgent.

The IDF also used coercion in the early stages of the occupation. Coercion has been demonstrated to be effective in gaining popular support only under specific conditions. The use of coercion is effective in getting someone to do something they do not want to, but the end result needs to demonstrate some benefit for the coerced group to achieve a lasting positive effect. For example, U.S. Marines in Nicaragua in the 1920’s used coercion to convince local Moskito supporters to attack a rebel leader. The Moskito’s feared annihilation by the rebel force, but when the rebel leader’s camp was

³⁰ Shlaim, 405.

captured the U.S. Marines had demonstrated to the Moskitos that they could succeed and subsequently won the Moskitos' loyalty. The IDF used coercion on the Lebanese population without providing any positive incentives. The Lebanese had to provide information to prevent reprisals on relatives held by the IDF (coercion), but the resulting information did not contribute in any way to an improved life for the Lebanese. To use the "carrot and stick" analogy, the IDF applied the "stick", but supplied no "carrot" to gain any lasting conformance.

The Insurgents were also faced with declining popular support. Hizballah identified the critical necessity for popular support and directed its efforts to counteract the loss at the target audience – the Population. Unlike the IDF application of Strategies 2 & 3 which was directed primarily at the insurgent movement, Hizballah focused on the Population through the efforts of the RC. Hizballah was able to counteract the deteriorating popular support by demonstrating the organization's dedication to the population's quality of life. The resultant correlation was that support for the insurgent movement would lead to a better life. Thus, Hizballah's attacks on the COIN Force (the source of IF's deteriorating popular support) had to continue, but the "carrot" given to the Population was that Hizballah's continued success (which required popular support) was tied to public and social services.

Hizballah also capitalized on Amal's mistakes to maximize popular support within the Shiite community. This was highlighted by an incident in 1993 when,

The Council of the South, a government organization close to Amal, apparently distributed aid along party lines, causing considerable discontent in the area. Hizballah made the most of the situation by furnishing assistance to villages bypassed by the Council of the South.³¹

Hizballah's capitalization on Amal's preferential distribution would continue to undermine Amal's support base and prove to have lasting effects evident in Hizballah's success in the 1992 political elections.

³¹ Judith Harik, "Between Islam and the System: Sources and Implications for Popular Support for Lebanon's Hizballah," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 40, No. 1, (1996): 41-67

Hizballah distributed public and social services without any evident concern for “free-riding”³². The RC could have distributed services preferentially thus limiting “free-riding”, but learned from Amal’s mistake and instead, as Harik puts it, “claim[ed] moral highground.”³³ Hizballah relied on their actions being sufficient to win popular support, without the need for coercive techniques. This lack of concern over “free-riding” can also be explained by the complete lack of popular support to the IDF, meaning at least passive support to the insurgent movement was already secured.

b. Strategy 2 - Separation of the Opponent and the Population

Israel’s consistently used force to separate the Population from the IF, rather than by co-opting the Population. The IDF continued to attempt to force the population to Israel’s will rather than convince them of the legitimacy of their cause. Israel’s tactics produced resentment not only in the Population, but even within the IDF. The cordon around southern Lebanon was the IDF’s attempt to halt the influx of insurgents from the north, thus separating the insurgents from their popular support base. In theory, this would prevent the infiltration of insurgents into the region, diminishing the number of insurgents conducting attacks, and eventually lead to a more stable life in the south. Instead, the Israeli cordon further drove a wedge between the occupation force and the local population. The mass application of Strategy 2 through force, at the expense of Strategy 1 (gaining popular support), caused further alienation of the Population and reinforced the perception of the IDF as oppressors. It also drove the Population to the insurgents, increasing recruitment and support.

Hizballah’s efforts to separate the CF from the Population were primarily through information/influence operations and perception management. The organization was not strong enough to physically deny the interaction between the IDF and the Population, but Hizballah used propaganda to prevent the IDF from gaining any popular support. Hizballah used the media under their Enforcement, Recruitment, and Propaganda branch (see Figure 2 above) to distribute the group’s ideology. The Research

³² Free-riding is the act of receiving the rewards of individual or group collective action without taking the risk of providing active or passive support. In the struggle for popular support, groups (Insurgent or COIN forces) will normally attempt to prevent free-riding. Groups will want to capitalize on their efforts by maximizing popular support from their actions through limiting the population’s free-riding ability. This forces the population to choose sides in order to receive the desired benefits.

³³ Harik, “Between Islam and the System,” 51.

and Propaganda division established a television station, two radio stations, and two publications to ensure the broadest dissemination of Hizballah's message. Propaganda focused on the mistakes of the IDF and "assert[ed] that the soldiers were occupiers and not their saviours."³⁴

Hizballah also embraced the rally cry of a cause larger than national liberation. Hizballah portrayed it as a struggle between Islam and Zionist oppression. This was a combination of denying support to the Zionist oppressors (Strategies 2) and increasing popular support for Hizballah (Strategy 1). Israel was forced to portray the fight as between Israel and Lebanon to prevent escalation into broader Arab State involvement. As Martin Kramer said, "this [Hizballah's] grandiose vision served the deepest needs of the most alienated of Lebanon's Shi'ites."³⁵

c. Strategy 3 - Direct Action Against the Opponent

The use of Strategy 3 by both the IF and CF alienated the Population and the International Community, but the critical difference is how the forces adapted their military operations in response to this. Neither side felt they could stop direct attacks without detrimental effects on their respective military objectives. The IDF responded to alienating the Population and International Community by increasing its attacks and repressive control measures. Hizballah identified the need to continue direct attacks (both for recruitment and to counter the IDF), but it used a combination of specific targets, religious approval, and provided services to maintain the Population's support. Hizballah introduced suicide attacks to demonstrate their dedication to the defeat of Israel. The suicide attack also gave Hizballah the ability to direct the assault at a specific target and time, thus limiting collateral damage. Approval of religious leaders was also obtained to justify and legitimize targets. The key difference between Israel and Hizballah's use of direct action was the consideration given to the effects. The IDF either failed to consider effects on the Population and International Community or considered the effects inconsequential; while Hizballah changed its military strategy to ensure

³⁴ Jaber, 50.

³⁵ Martin Marty and Scott Appleby, ed., *Fundamentalisms and the State: remaking politics, militance, and economies* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993) 546.

continued support from the Population, while achieving the desired effects on the International Community (withdrawal of the MNF).

d. Strategy 4 - Separation of the Opponent and the International Community

The UNMNF was the International Community's (more specifically western countries) attempt to get involved in Lebanon, initially as peacekeepers and later on the side of the CF. Hizballah proved capable of disrupting the International Community's involvement. The UNMNF chose sides in the conflict, violating their neutrality and legitimizing the UNMNF as targets for Hizballah. The subsequent attacks increased the MNF's price of involvement to an unacceptable level. Israel and the MNF attempted Strategy 4, by attacking/capturing Syrian Forces and Iranian Revolutionary Guard members. The physical costs for Iran and Syria were never raised to a level that outweighed the importance of involvement. The diplomatic costs were never raised enough to coerce Iran or Syria into denying support. The attacks on the MNF barracks raised the U.S. and French costs of involvement to unacceptable levels. Thus Hizballah was able to achieve success in Strategy 4, while Israel did not.

e. Strategy 5 - Involving the International Community

The International Community had a significant effect in Lebanon during both the war with Israel and the Civil War. Iran and Syria had the most direct involvement in the area, but international opinion affected both insurgent and COIN operations. Iran's Islamic revolution was instrumental in shaping Hizballah's ideology; the Iranian Revolution served as an example and inspiration for Hizballah's own insurgent movement. Iranian financial and resource support also boosted Hizballah's flexibility and allowed the organization to operate on a larger scale. Iranian training, combined with material and financial support, helped Hizballah transition from a weak insurgent group to a "force in being." The RC also thrived with the help of Iranian financial and resource support, supplying technical assistance, resources, and financial backing to execute the RC's broad range of public and social services. It is possible that Hizballah may have been just as capable of accomplishing this without Iran's support, the movement was strong and based in popular perceptions and might have risen above the resource constraints without international support. There is no data linking Hizballah's strength to the amount of foreign aid it was receiving, but it is likely that the

organization's expansion would not have been as rapid without foreign (Iranian and/or other organization) support. Syria's support was focused on the more secular Amal, but Syria's lack of border control benefited Hizballah by allowing materials (weapons, ammunition, tractors...) into the country.

Iranian support to Hizballah was arguably more influential in the battle for Lebanese popular support, than it was to military operations. Hizballah used Iran's support to make the RC a critical service provider within the country. The RC became so important to the population that even if the Lebanese Government had wanted to make a move against the organization, the government would have had to do so against Lebanese popular opinion. As Lebanese and Hizballah expert Judith Harik noted, "It would be particularly difficult for the government to move against them [the RC] should it desire to undercut a major source of Hizballah's popularity."³⁶ The RC's essential work in the region won Hizballah popular support at the local level and propelled the organization to significant prominence in the Lebanese Political system.

In the local struggle for Shiite support, Harik pointed to the direct correlation between the ability of the organization (Hizballah or Amal) to provide social services and the ability to mobilize the large Shiite population. Hizballah, with Iran's support, was more effective in providing these services, gaining Hizballah critical Shiite and Lebanese popular support. The RC's support transcended the Shiite community. Hizballah's capabilities and policy of providing support to anyone in need gained them support throughout Lebanon. This can best be seen in an interview by Harik with a Lebanese Christian about an incident prior to the 1992 elections.

The candidate, who lost to one of Hizballah's contestants in the 1992 parliamentary elections, had solicited the vote of a lifelong acquaintance, a Christian from Bishwat in the Biqa'a. In reply, the man from Bishwat had asked "Where were you when we needed emergency snow removal and fuel? In this village, everyone is going to vote for Hizballah."³⁷

C. ANALYSIS OF THE FIVE STRATEGIES

The application of McCormick's model to the war in Lebanon clearly demonstrates that Hizballah executed a well planned insurgency following the

³⁶ Harik, *Public and Social Services*, 53.

³⁷ Harik, "Between Islam and the System", 55.

fundamentals of the model. Simultaneously the analysis shows that Israel did not follow the fundamentals of counterinsurgency and subsequently failed. The model provides insight into both sides' actions and the effects those actions had on the ultimate outcome of the war. There is a direct correlation between the application (or lack thereof) of the model's Strategies and Principle to success or failure of the effort.

Hizballah inherently understood the Principle behind McCormick's counterinsurgency model and used the model's strategies effectively, though Hizballah had not received formal training in insurgent strategy³⁸. The development of Hizballah's campaign plan revolved around considerations for the Population, and the organization ensured this was present throughout the insurgency's planning process. While the IDF focused on military objectives and might, Hizballah focused on the Population as its primary consideration, maintaining the moral and religious "high ground". Both the CF and IF understood the necessity of direct action on the opponent, but Hizballah followed Strategy 3 within the limits it could positively effect popular and international perception.

The IDF approached the occupation with a conventional military focus; the primary consideration was the military (as opposed to political) defeat of the opponent. If the IDF had approached the conflict as an insurgency, understanding that popular and international perceptions were critical, they may have achieved Israel's objective of a secure northern boarder. The Israeli failure to establish a unified security force, in conjunction with the southern Lebanese population instead of despite them, prevented the Israelis from developing a stable security zone. The IDF failed to establish or maintain its connection with either the Population or the International Community (failure of Strategies 1 & 5). Additionally, the IDF failed to disrupt Hizballah's connection with either the Population or the International Community (failure of Strategies 2 & 4). The Israelis' implemented Strategy 3 successfully, but failed to consider the effects of their direct actions. So even if the operations were conducted flawlessly from a military perspective, the overarching strategy was flawed throughout.

Hizballah capitalized on the IDF mistakes and unified the southern population against the Israelis. Hizballah was able to exploit the underlying disillusionment of the

³⁸ Hizballah did receive trainers from Iran, but research indicates this was primarily military and ideological training, not necessarily strategic planning.

Population and unify Lebanon through an application of Strategies 1 thru 3. Throughout the insurgency Hizballah used all five strategies, but emphasized Strategy 1 (popular support) as the main effort and the other strategies as supporting efforts. The RC's contributions to Hizballah's insurgency were vital in reinforcing popular support and instrumental in the success of the overall insurgency. Iran's support (Strategy 5) proved critical to Hizballah's success. Military training and more importantly financial and resource support allowed Hizballah to transition from a "force in development" to a "force in being". Hizballah also successfully executed Strategy 4, causing the withdrawal of the MNF and the alienation of the IDF and Christian Militias.

The Lebanese population needed a champion for their cause, and Hizballah filled that role. Hizballah members made themselves seen as national liberation fighters. According to Professor Baylouny "This is overwhelming -- even the [Lebanese] Christians, who in general are quite racist against anything Muslim, are proud of Hizballah having kicked out Israel."³⁹ Hizballah was able to unify the population, not just the Shiites, under a cause that was seen to benefit all of Lebanon. While it may have been an un-winnable situation for the IDF no matter what actions were taken⁴⁰, the model clearly indicates that the IDF were doomed to failure by not considering the model's fundamentals.

The situation in Lebanon may be somewhat unique (as are all insurgencies), but the fundamentals of McCormick's insurgency/counterinsurgency model applied to Lebanon aptly explain the model. Dr. McCormick's Model is just as applicable in the Middle East as it is in Latin America, because it addresses the underlying nature and causes of an insurgency rather than specific considerations of any particular insurgency. Just as the factors in any country are not exactly alike, neither is the methodology behind an insurgency. The specific conditions of an insurgency dictate the application of the

³⁹ Anne Marie Baylouny, "RE: Hizballah / Lebanon," Email to author, 1 June 2004

⁴⁰ The point has been made that the IDF could not have gained popular support based on the ethnic/religious prejudices of the region. Basically no Muslim would support Israel. The counter to this point is in Hizballah's ability to unify portions of the population to their cause despite traditional divides. This can be seen in the quote above where the Christian voted for Hizballah's candidate because Hizballah provided support when they needed it. This indicates that traditional preferences can be surpassed by current actions. Support is gained by the side that provides the best prospects for the future. People require sustenance and security to survive; if these cannot be obtained through traditional allegiances they will accept them from whoever can fulfill the requirement.

model's strategies. Forces must remain flexible, actively seeking feedback from their target audience and adjusting their operations as necessary. The fundamentals behind the model remain applicable to any insurgency/counterinsurgency campaign. The utility of the model is that it identifies strategies that succeeded or failed, which can then be used to provide insight into future conflicts.

IV. GLOBAL INSURGENCY

[T]he threat America faces from bin Laden is not the episodic terrorist campaign typical of those perpetrated by traditional terrorist groups. It is rather a worldwide, religiously inspired, and professionally guided Islamist insurgency...

Anonymous⁴¹

A. WHAT IS THE GLOBAL INSURGENCY?

An intra-state insurgent's objective is to remove a government or occupying force and establish a new political order. The global insurgent's objective is to remove western influence from the Muslim world and establish an Islamic caliphate.⁴² Intra-state insurgents use remote areas as safe havens to plan, train, and organize; in the global insurgency the terrorists use weak states or contested/uncontrolled areas as their safe havens. An intra-state insurgency is not defeated by defending the cities, in the global war on terrorism the U.S. "cannot rely solely or even primarily on a defensive strategy."⁴³ Each region/municipality must work, either with or without national government support, to defeat the intra-state insurgent. In the global insurgency each country must work, either with or without international support, to defeat the global insurgent.

The conflict between "terrorists of global reach"⁴⁴ and the U.S and its allies has been described in many ways: the U.S. Government refers to it as the "War on Terrorism,"⁴⁵ Samuel P. Huntington calls it a "Clash of Civilizations,"⁴⁶ and the 9/11 Commission said the U.S. was caught in a "Clash *within* a Civilization."⁴⁷ The objective

⁴¹ Anonymous, *Through Our Enemies' Eyes*. Washington, DC: Brassey's, Inc., 2002, xvii.

⁴² See bin Laden's 1996 and 1998 Fatwa's.

⁴³ Douglas Feith, *U.S. Strategy for the War on Terrorism*, April 14, 2004. From a speech given to the Political Union University of Chicago. Chicago, IL

⁴⁴ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, 1. Terrorism is an inherently illegitimate cause.

⁴⁵ Bush, 2.

⁴⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster).

⁴⁷ United States Government, *the 9/11 Report: The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* St. Martin's Paperbacks edition / August 2004 (New York: St. Martin's Press) 518. This

of this chapter is not to add another to the list of names or to prove that this is a global insurgency. The purpose is to bypass the debate over defining the conflict as a global insurgency⁴⁸ and determine the utility of addressing the conflict as a global insurgency. The main assumption is that the dynamics of the global insurgency parallel an intra-state insurgency. Based on this assumption, the tools utilized to analyze an intra-state insurgency equally apply to the concept of a global insurgency. Dr. McCormick's counterinsurgency model will be used to analyze the current strategies of the opposing forces in the conflict to determine if the U.S. and its allies are applying the basic fundamentals required to defeat a global insurgent.

On September 11, 2001 nineteen hijackers conducted a synchronized attack on the United States. This attack served as a message from al Qaeda that the war it had declared in 1996⁴⁹ was being brought to U.S. soil. Like the attacks on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the United States was being pulled into a war that was already ongoing. Unlike the attacks bringing the U.S. into World War II, the United States is not coming to the aid of its allies, but is entering the conflict to defend its global interests as the lone superpower.

In 2001, President Bush declared that the United States was at war with terrorism. The 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) states, "The enemy is not one person. It is not a single political regime. Certainly it is not a religion. The enemy is terrorism."⁵⁰ While the NSCT states the enemy is simply terrorism, the 9/11 report began to define who and what terrorism is. The report stated:

refers to an "insurgency within Islam" indicating a war in which the U.S. is only a member of the International Community.

⁴⁸ See the following arguments for defining the conflict as a global insurgency: Michael Vlahos, *Terror's Mask: Insurgency within Islam*, (Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins University, Joint Warfare Analysis Department, 2002). Daniel Byman, "Scoring the War on Terrorism," *The National Interest*, Summer 2003, 75-84. Grant Highland, *New Century, Old Problems: The Global Insurgency Within Islam and the Nature of the War on Terror*, (Newport, RI: Naval War College, FEB 2003). Michael Kometer, *The New Terrorism: The Nature of the War on Terrorism*, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, June 2002). This list is meant to provide examples and is not all inclusive.

⁴⁹ In his August 23, 1996 fatwah "The Declaration of War" Usamah bin Muhammad bin Laden declared war "against the Americans occupying the land of the two holy places [the Arabian Peninsula]." Translated by Muhammad A. S. Al-Mass'ari.

⁵⁰ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, February 2003, 1.

Our enemy is twofold: al Qaeda, a stateless network of terrorists that struck us on 9/11; and a radical ideological movement in the Islamic world, inspired in part by al Qaeda, which has spawned terrorist groups and violence across the globe.⁵¹

The enemy in the Global Insurgency thus becomes the al Qaeda Network (AQN) and the broader radical Islamic ideological movement they espouse.

1. Birth of the Insurgency

The United States had been combating terrorism for years, but it was not until the events of 11 September 2001 that all elements of the government were mobilized in a “war on terrorism.” On the other hand, the insurgent, specifically al Qaeda, had already been planning and fighting the war against the United States for over a decade. In an interview in 1998 bin Laden said:

It has been nine years since we have been struggling against the United States ... In these nine years, we have inflicted considerable damage on the United States in different places and will continue to do the same in the future.⁵²

This indicates that in 1989, the same year as the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, al Qaeda had shifted its focus to the United States.

Bin Laden formed his ideological foundation during his fighting in Afghanistan. He framed the conflict as one of Islam vs. Kufr (non-believer in Islam), this allowed him the flexibility to establish a support base that transcended international borders and was based in religious beliefs. “Unlike many nationalist movements in Algeria, Egypt, Palestine, or even Saudi Arabia, where jihad was launched for the good of the homeland, this particular jihad was for Allah and geopolitics.”⁵³ The AQN, just as Hizballah had done in Lebanon, embraces the rally cry of a cause larger than national liberation. Kramer’s comment on Hizballah, “this grandiose vision served the deepest needs of the most alienated,”⁵⁴ is also applicable to al Qaeda and the broader Islamist movement. The battle against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan became a struggle against evil and

⁵¹ *The 9/11 Report*, 519.

⁵² Abu Shiraz, “May 1998 Interview with Bin Ladin Reported,” *Pakistan*, 10, 20 February 1999. (Original article published in Urdu. Article translated by and available through the Foreign Broadcast Information Service).

⁵³ Mamoun Fandy, 191.

⁵⁴ Marty and Appleby, 546.

atheism, and the Mujahideen became its “Muslim warriors.” “For him [bin Laden] the language and symbols of ideology take precedence over the political or economic realities.”⁵⁵

Following the conclusion of the Afghanistan war, the Arab fighters that answered the call to jihad expected to be recognized as heroes of Islam. As noted Saudi historian Mamoun Fandy stated, instead “the public did not share this euphoria with the Islamist fighters.” He goes on to say that “this, in addition to shellshock and other war-related factors, turned the men into social misfits who were looking for another war to fight.” Bin Laden and al Qaeda were prepared to fill this void with the fight against the “apostate” Saudi Regime and their American supporters. As bin Laden put it:

The [Saudi] regime is fully responsible for what had been incurred by the country and the nation; however the occupying American enemy is the principle and the main cause of the situation. Therefore efforts should be concentrated on destroying, fighting and killing the enemy...⁵⁶

Bin Laden failed to change the Saudi regime from within and used his ideological leadership and contacts developed during the Afghan war to unite the disaffected Arab fighters in a new struggle for Islam. The struggle expanded from removal of the apostate Saudi regime, to include removal of western influence on the Arabian Peninsula, and continued to expand to the removal of western influence from all Muslim countries.

2. Al Qaeda’s Vision and Mission

“[Al Qaeda’s] current goal is to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the world by working with allied Islamic extremist groups to overthrow regimes it deems ‘non-Islamic’ and expelling Westerners and non-Muslims [and their influence] from Muslim countries—particularly Saudi Arabia.”⁵⁷ Al Qaeda’s main opponents are the United States and Israel; but Al Qaeda has not limited its “declarations of war” to the United States and Israel exclusively. In July 2004 an Islamist website posted a message saying “we declare a ‘bloody war’ on you [European states].”⁵⁸ This was posted as a

⁵⁵ Mamoun Fandy, 191.

⁵⁶ Usamah bin Laden, “Declaration of War.”

⁵⁷ U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism - 2003*, Released 29 April 2004. Available from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/31711.htm>; Internet; Accessed 21 October 2004.

⁵⁸ “Al-Qaeda declares war on Europe as deadline passes,” *Taipei Times*, 30 July 2004; available from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2004/07/30/2003180983/print>; Internet; accessed 21

message to the European states for failing to adhere to bin Laden's ultimatum to withdraw troops from Muslim countries. Authenticity of the statement has not been verified,⁵⁹ but if true, it indicates al Qaeda's desire to continue to expand the war beyond its initially stated objectives to include any and every entity deemed to oppose Islam.

The next step (following the defeat of the U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan) toward establishing a pan-Islamic Caliphate is to remove the U.S./western influence throughout the Muslim community. Usamah bin Laden has said:

We are certain - with the grace of Allah - that we shall prevail over the Jews and over those fighting with them. Today however, our battle against the Americans is far greater than our battle was against the Russians. Americans have committed unprecedented stupidity. They have attacked Islam and its most significant sacrosanct symbols... We anticipate a black future for America. Instead of remaining United States, it shall end up separated states and shall have to carry the bodies of its sons back to America.⁶⁰

Bin Laden bases his jihad on the history of Islam, which gives it broad appeal to the Umma (community of the Muslim faithful). As the Mongols and Crusaders were defeated by Muslims in the 13th Century, bin Laden views himself as fighting the modern day battles against the enemies of Islam. The defeat of the Soviet army in Afghanistan represents the defeat of the modern day Mongols, while the defeat of the "Zionist-Crusader alliance"⁶¹ will represent the completion of the modern day Islamic cycle of history. "Bin Laden ... believes that he and his followers brought down the evil empire of communism in Afghanistan,"⁶² where, in bin Laden's words, "by the Grace of Allah-the largest infidel military force of the world was destroyed."⁶³

October 2004.

⁵⁹ The ultimatum has been authenticated by the U.S. CIA, but not the follow-up declaration of a bloody war.

⁶⁰ John Miller, "Interview Osama Bin Laden, May 1998," *Frontline*; available from <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/interview.html>; Internet; accessed 21 October 2004.

⁶¹ Usamah bin Laden, "Declaration of War"

⁶² Mamoun Fandy, *Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1999), 179.

⁶³ Usamah bin Laden, "Declaration of War."

In the 1996 “Declaration of War” bin Laden quotes the Prophet Mohammad who said: “around twelve thousand will emerge from Aden/Abian helping-the cause of-Allah and his messenger, they are the best, in the time, between me and them.”⁶⁴ Bin Laden views his followers as the core of these 12,000 defenders of Islam. This belief was exemplified by bin Laden’s offer to Saudi Arabia to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait following their 1990 invasion⁶⁵ and thus “replacing the crusaders forces [U.S. military] by an Islamic force composed of the sons of the country and other Muslim people.”⁶⁶ The rejection of this offer served to heighten bin Laden’s antipathy for the Saudi government and reinforced bin Laden’s perception that the Saudi regime had “betrayed the Ummah and joined the Kufr ... one of the ten ‘voiders’ of Islam.”⁶⁷ Usamah bin Laden uses the betrayal of the Saudi Regime to question the legitimacy of that government and reinforce the legitimacy, in the eyes of the Ummah, of Al Qaeda’s cause. The AQN are the defenders of Islam and it is their duty to remove the crusaders, and the apostate regimes that support them, from Muslim countries worldwide.

3. United States’ Vision and Mission

To be successful in the war on terrorism, the United States must ensure that neither the AQN nor the broader radical ideological movement within Islam achieve their strategic objectives. The goal of the broader radical ideological movement is to return Islam to its global leadership role by establishing a regional and/or global caliphate. The goal of the AQN is to remove the Saudi Regime and its western supporters (specifically the U.S.) from Muslim countries in support of the broader ideological movement.

The 9/11 Commission report divides the conflict into two critical branches: the war of ideas and combating the AQN. The two branches must be addressed simultaneously and will often overlap. A comprehensive and overarching strategic plan must be established to ensure a continuous and seamless approach is followed. One

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Fandy, 183. Additional background for this conclusion was obtained from an interview on the *Discovery Times Channel* of a, then, Saudi Intelligence Official. The official stated (paraphrased) that Usamah bin Laden had offered to fight Iraq so the Saudi’s would not have to rely on the infidel army of the United States for defense (Transcript of the program is unavailable). Bin Laden felt that if he and his Muslim fighters fought Iraq there would then be no need for the U.S. to maintain a presence in Saudi Arabia.

⁶⁶ Usamah bin Laden, “Declaration of War.”

⁶⁷ Ibid.

branch cannot be addressed without considering the implications on the other; the strategy for each can - and must - be mutually supportive. U.S. Joint Staff doctrine for Psychological Operations states that “all military actions should be thoroughly evaluated for their psychological implications.”⁶⁸ Similarly all military actions must be thoroughly evaluated for their psychological and political implications on the war of ideas. Conversely, all diplomatic actions in the war of ideas must be thoroughly evaluated for their psychological and political implications on combating the AQN. Will military operations in country *B* affect the progress of diplomatic coordination in the war of ideas? Will diplomatic agreements with country *A* affect the prosecution of military operations against the AQN? These are critical questions that must be asked throughout the conduct of countering the global insurgency. The planning and actions of all elements of the U.S. Government, as well as its allies, must be unified and cohesive to ensure a comprehensive plan is executed. While this study primarily focuses on combating the AQN, the conclusions also provide insights into the broader war of ideas.

The U.S. NSCT states that:

The intent of our national strategy is to stop terrorist attacks against the United States, its citizens, its interests, and our friends and allies around the world and ultimately, to create an international environment inhospitable to terrorists and all those who support them.⁶⁹

The strategy goes on to say that this will be accomplished by simultaneously acting on four fronts; commonly referred to as the “four D’s”: Defeat, Deny, Diminish, and Defend.

a. Defeat

The NSCT outlines how the United States will *defeat* terrorists of global reach by initially attacking their established infrastructure: “sanctuaries; leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances.”⁷⁰ The disruption this causes will force the terrorists to disperse and decentralize removing their

⁶⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, Joint Pub 3-53”, 10 July 1996, I-3.

⁶⁹ George W. Bush, 11.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

global influence. Once the “global reach” capability is restricted, the terrorists are pushed back below the spectrum of global threat to localized threats. The terrorists will then be attacked in conjunction with regional partners and allies, providing a cumulative reduction of the terrorist’s threat capabilities, and returning terrorism to the “criminal domain.”⁷¹

b. Deny

The main focus of *deny* is on terrorist “sponsorship, support, and sanctuary.”⁷² The United States, in coordination with UN Security Council resolutions and 12 UN conventions and protocols, will attempt to prevent the terrorists from recruiting, refitting, and reorganizing. Separating terrorists from their sponsors and support will deny availability of critical resources needed to plan, train for, and conduct operations. Denying sanctuary will prevent the terrorists from having the opportunity to reorganize and reestablish a global threat. A terrorist that is constantly on the move to survive does not have time to plan or conduct major operations.

c. Diminish

This front is designed to *diminish* the “underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit.”⁷³ The United States in conjunction with the international community will focus resources and efforts on at risk regions to prevent the (re)emergence of terrorists. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) Douglas Feith’s April 2004 speech further expanded on this area of emphasis. Combining the NSCT and USD(P) Feith’s speech broadens *diminish* to include “countering ideological support for terrorism... which is sometimes referred to as the battle of ideas.” This addition makes *diminish* a critical aspect in the war on terrorism. As Mr. Feith says in his speech, “The war on terrorism will never end if all we do is disrupt and attack terrorist networks.” Addressing the underlying conditions not only refers to economic and political conditions, but more importantly the ideological conditions that terrorists seek to exploit. This is an emphasis that was not readily apparent in the NSCT alone.

⁷¹ Ibid., 13.

⁷² Ibid., 11.

⁷³ Ibid., 12.

d. Defend

Defend is the specific act of protecting the United States, its citizens, and its national interests at home and abroad. This is to be done by both proactively establishing homeland defenses and extending defense to identify and neutralize the threat as early as possible.

B. APPLICATION OF MCCORMICK'S MODEL

1. The Players

a. The Insurgent Force - The Al Qaeda Network

The focus in this case study is the AQN. The war on terrorism has grown from a war with al Qaeda to include the organizations that directly or indirectly support al Qaeda's objectives. These supporting terrorist organizations can be motivated by the Islamist ideology or their own particular beliefs. The critical factor is if they are willing to provide active or passive support to the AQN in the achievement of al Qaeda's strategic objectives, whether separate or parallel to their own strategic objectives. Thus any organization becomes part of the AQN if they are willing to support the battle against western influence as defined by Usamah bin Laden.

b. The Counterinsurgent Force - The Coalition

The United States and its coalition partners are the primary COIN force. This is based as much on the insurgent declaring the U.S. as the primary enemy, as on the U.S. lead in the war on terrorism. Once again the insurgent is defining its opponent.

Far from being alone in the conflict, the United States has many allies in the war on terrorism. The allies are defined by traditional international alliances and agreements as well as the perceptions of the insurgent. The United States has called upon many old and new allies for support in the war on terrorism. President George W. Bush has further attempted to induce support and polarize the issue with statements like "you are either with us, or with the terrorists."⁷⁴ Additionally the insurgent has defined the European states as members of the COIN force (assuming the website declaration of a "bloody war" referenced above is a true reflection of the AQN leadership's desires). In

⁷⁴ George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," speech given September 2001; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>; accessed 22 October 2004.

the eyes of the insurgent the European states have chosen the side of the COIN force by failing to remove their troops from Muslim countries.

c. The Population

The population refers to the global population. Within the global population there are focus groups whose support is critical to both sides. One critical focus group is the Umma (Muslim community of the faithful). The Umma is the primary community that the AQN relies on for support;⁷⁵ therefore it is “key terrain” within the global population. The non-Muslim population remains critical in the battle for legitimacy and broader global support. Both forces rely on popular support to legitimize their actions. The AQN targets the population (Muslim or not) to influence their perceptions in an attempt to break the Coalition’s national will to continue the struggle. This is similar, for example, to the intra-state insurgency in Malaya from 1948-1960. In Malaya the communist Chinese were the critical support base for the insurgents, similar to the Umma for the AQN. While the communist Chinese were an important focus group, the entire population of Malaya was critical to the conduct of the counter insurgency. So while many efforts were directed at the Chinese in Malaya, all actions were made with consideration to the effects on the entire population. Thus the communist Chinese became a focus group within the Malayan population. So while the Umma may be a critical focus group within the population, the global population as a whole remains the center of gravity in the global insurgency.

d. The International Community

The International Community is defined as the State and non-State leaders or organizations that have influence over large segments of the population but do not actively or passively support either the AQN or the Coalition. The State leaders are the recognized governments throughout the world. A state government is a member of the

⁷⁵ The AQN is willing to accept support from non-Muslim communities, but the primary support base is the Umma. In his 1996 “Declaration of War” bin Laden says that “If it is not possible to fight except with the help of non righteous military personnel and commanders, then there are two possibilities: either fighting will be ignored and the others, who are the great danger to this life and religion, will take control; or to fight with the help of non righteous rulers and therefore repelling the greatest of the two dangers and implementing most, though not all, of the Islamic laws.” This is perhaps how he justified support from the United States and other “Infidel” countries during the Afghanistan war against the Soviets. Now he is attempting to implement the Islamic law in the rest of the world. He used U.S. aid to defeat the Soviets (“the greatest of the two dangers”) and is now turning to rid the world of the rest of the threat to “this life and religion.”

International Community because they have influence over their population and have the authority to mobilize (or abstain from mobilizing) forces in support of either the Insurgent or COIN forces. Additionally a state government has the capacity to influence decisions within recognized international organizations, like the UN, NATO, or OAS. Non-State leaders are the organizational leaders that do not have a voice in recognized international diplomatic organizations, but still have the capability to influence large portions of a population or the international community, and in some cases mobilize forces. For example, decisions of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) can have a significant impact on the international economy and can influence popular opinion. Other non-state members of the International Community would include religious organizations, international corporations, and other national and international organizations whose influence transcends state boundaries.⁷⁶

2. Strategic Analysis

The AQN strategy has been one of attacking/influencing any and all weaknesses of the U.S. and its allies. “In targeting the United States, al Qaeda will kill as many Americans as possible in as many attacks as it can carefully prepare and execute.”⁷⁷ The AQN is following a strategy of “death by a thousand cuts” to slowly bleed out its enemy to defeat its forces and, more importantly, erode the national will to continue the fight. The 9/11 attacks were designed to strike at the political and economic (materialistic) heart of the United States. The AQN felt that only an attack of that magnitude could attract the attention of the U.S. population and potentially change U.S. foreign policy.

In addition to physical attacks, the AQN is maintaining a consistent assault on the perceptions of the population. The use of suicide attackers is “an especially convincing way to signal the likelihood of more pain to come...one that suggests that the attackers

⁷⁶ The Vatican can serve as a good example for both a state and non-state member of the International community. The Vatican is a “state” member of the International community in so far as it has signed treaties with Italy acknowledging its sovereignty as an independent state and has a diplomatic corps (The Holy See) with non-member voting privileges in the United Nation. The Vatican’s “non-state” member characteristics evolve out of its influence over Catholics worldwide. About 1 billion people worldwide profess the Catholic faith, indicating an influence that crosses international borders. Influence on over 1 billion people make it a valuable ally for any force. For more information on the Holy See (Vatican City) see the CIA World Factbook at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/vt.html>, accessed 19 October 2004.

⁷⁷ Anonymous, *Through our Enemies’ Eyes*, 230.

could not have been deterred...”⁷⁸ The psychological message to the population is that there is no end to this war without the appeasement of the AQN demands. The AQN also continuously restates the justification for its actions and reinforces its legitimacy; never forgetting that “*persuasion* is the ultimate purpose of every action.”⁷⁹ The AQN message is based in Tugwell’s mobilizing trinity: the AQN cause is based on faith in Islam and righteous in the eyes of Allah, the Coalition are Kufr and are therefore evil in the eyes of Allah, the will of Allah makes victory inevitable.⁸⁰

The U.S. historically approached terrorism as a police responsibility to be investigated by the FBI. “Our government was looking for individuals to arrest, extradite and prosecute in criminal courts.”⁸¹ USD(P) Feith goes on to say that

President Bush broke with that practice - and with that frame of mind - when he decided that 9/11 meant that we are at war. He decided that the US would respond not with the FBI and U.S. attorneys, but with our armed forces and every instrument of U.S. national power.

Military historian Victor Davis Hanson characterized this approach as a “tripartite strategy...: kill or capture the al-Qaeda purveyors of death; end renegade regimes...; and promote democratic reform in the Middle East.”⁸² The military is executing this strategy by hunting for AQN leadership world wide and, thus far, removing two renegade regimes (the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Hussein regime in Iraq); while placing considerable resources towards promoting democratic reforms. This military strategy is designed to provide a relatively quick conclusion to the conflict by executing a coup de main blow to the AQN. Removal of the AQN leadership will cause the break up of the network and elimination of the global threat. Removal of renegade regimes will deny the AQN safe

⁷⁸ Robert Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” *American Political Science Review* Vol 97, No. 3 (August 2003): 343-61.

⁷⁹ Maurice Tugwell, “Terrorism as a Psychological Strategy,” *Psychological Operations and Political Warfare in Long-term Strategic Planning*, ed. Janos Radvanyi (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 70.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 74. Tugwell’s mobilizing trinity is based on the concept that followers will fight or resist so long as three essential beliefs are held: “First, a belief in something good to be promoted or defended. Second, a belief in something evil to be destroyed or resisted. Third, a belief in the ultimate victory of the good cause.” pp. 70-74.

⁸¹ Douglas Feith

⁸² Victor Davis Hanson, “Country at a Crossroads,” *National Review*, Vol. 56, Iss. 21 (November 2004): 32-34

havens and critical resource support. This is a throwback to the traditional conventional U.S. military way of conducting wars; utilizing “technological overmatch”⁸³ to defeat the opponent.

Missing from current Coalition efforts is a robust information campaign designed to: deny recruitment to the AQN, prevent the re-emergence of the threat when/if the current network is destroyed, and justify Coalition operations providing legitimacy through popular and international community support. While the AQN message is repeated consistently, the Coalition has failed to shape global perceptions. The Coalition leaves its actions to speak for themselves, rather than explaining the purpose behind the actions. This means that the Coalition is influencing the “body”, but not the “mind” of the opponent and more importantly the population. Additionally, not explaining its actions leaves a window of opportunity for the AQN to explain the Coalition actions in a way that benefits the AQN.

The more active and intrusive U.S. military forces are in Islam the easier it is for the insurgency to make a truly compelling case for *jihad*, increase popular support, and put pressure on skittish Arab regimes.⁸⁴

The Coalition lack of justification and responses to AQN explanations causes the population and international community to question Coalition legitimacy.

a. Strategy 1 - Struggle for Support of the Population

Noted terrorism/insurgency experts Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Taw state:

Terrorists and insurgents cannot ultimately succeed against the government without support from the general population; when the government responds effectively to the political and economic needs of the population⁸⁵, insurgency and terrorism have a much less fertile environment in which to grow. When, however, the government is not responsive, if its interests and the population’s are completely immutable

⁸³ Robert M. Cassidy, “Back to the Street without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam and other Small Wars,” *Parameters* (Summer 2004): 73-83.

⁸⁴ Michael Vlahos, *Terror’s Mask*, 18.

⁸⁵ Also include “religious needs” to the list. In the case of the Umma, the political and economic responses must be provided, while also catering to the religious needs of the community. In other words, the political and economic responses must be integrated with the religious ideology of the general population. A political and/or economic system can not be embraced if it does not fit within the religious system the general population adheres to.

and popular dissatisfaction is allowed to grow with few or no political concessions offered, terrorists or insurgents are more likely to find both active and tacit antigovernment support within the population. This will severely compromise intelligence-gathering and can also be exploited for propaganda purposes by the terrorist or insurgent.⁸⁶

This section will start by addressing the target audiences and current strategies used by the AQN and Coalition in the struggle for popular support. The second section will address three key components of the struggle for popular support: the information war, control, and legitimacy. Strategy 1 is a broad category, but the three focus areas concentrate on the means and critical *needs* that Strategy 1 must address.

The AQN is focusing its efforts on gaining the popular support of the Umma. The struggle, as defined by the insurgent, is not political or diplomatic but religious (although the religious objectives have political implications as well), therefore support from the Umma is critical to the AQN's ability to survive and operate. The emphasis of the AQN on the non-Muslim population of the world has been to deter support to the Coalition (this will be discussed further under Strategy 2 below). The Umma provides the AQN with resources, recruits, security, and legitimacy. These are the essential requirements for the continued existence of the insurgency.

The Coalition does not have the luxury of focusing on one segment of the global population for support; it must focus on the entire global population. The Umma is the critical link to the AQN; without the Umma's support the intelligence required to identify and locate the AQN cannot be obtained and legitimacy within the Muslim community will not be achieved. Specific intelligence on the AQN is essential to permit discriminate targeting and to avoid the tactic of mass reprisals. Discriminate targeting must be used to prevent collateral damage which has a negative effect on popular support. Mass reprisals and/or indiscriminate targeting will lead the Coalition into the self-defeating spiral experienced by the IDF in Lebanon. Non-Muslim popular support is critical to the Coalition to prevent the (re)emergence of insurgent sanctuaries/sympathizers and provide the legitimacy necessary to continue the long-term counterinsurgency struggle.

⁸⁶ Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Taw, *A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND), vi.

The AQN's strategy for gaining/maintaining popular support is aimed at presenting the conflict as one of Islam vs. evil. This appeals to the Umma on a religious ideological level and makes participation in the conflict the "ultimate level of believing in the religion."⁸⁷ Participation in the insurgency and support to the AQN becomes the "duty of every Muslim in this world."⁸⁸

The Coalition's strategy for gaining/maintaining popular support is aimed at presenting the conflict as one of freedom and democracy vs. oppression. This is an appeal for self determination on a political ideological level. While this is a powerful argument, it does not directly confront the religious ideological appeal from the AQN. Just as the AQN is able to choose the time and place for physical attacks, the AQN is also defining the battlespace for the ideological struggle. The Coalition must address the conflict within the same spectrum that the AQN is pursuing. This means that the Coalition must address the conflict from the religious ideological perspective as well, demonstrating how the Coalition's actions are in the best interest of the Umma from a religious ideological perspective. The current strategy has a strong message for gaining non-Muslim support, but it fails to have the same impact on portions of the Umma.

Information War and Perception Management

Coalition information operations must have a global focus to be successful. An example of the U.S.'s locally, rather than globally, focused information campaign was given by LTC Yadi, a Malaysian Army officer.⁸⁹ LTC Yadi commented that the U.S. population has been convinced of al Qaeda's role in the September 11th attacks, but much of the world (especially the Umma) has not been afforded the same "proof" and are still not convinced. A large part of the world population still doubting al

⁸⁷ Bin Laden, "Declaration of War."

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ LTC Yadi highlighted this point during a class discussion at the Naval Postgraduate School, May 2004. LTC Yadi was speaking as a representative of the foreign community, while he understands al Qaeda's role in the 9/11 attacks, he was highlighting the fact that there are many portions of the population that have not received the same information. Similar points can be found in multiple media reports.

Qaeda's role in the attacks indicates a significant failure of the Coalition's information operations and a potential inability to counter "the widespread ideological support for terrorism?"⁹⁰

The United States has begun to address the U.S. population through legislation and limited attempts at influencing the public. Once again the U.S. plan is focusing locally rather globally. Responses to a global threat must be a unified effort from the allies, coalitions, and alliance organizations (i.e. United Nations, NATO, EU, OAS...) within the Coalition.⁹¹ A shift in information operations from local to global "public trust and support" has to occur. As the 9/11 report recommends:

The small percentage of Muslims who are fully committed to Usama Bin Ladin's version of Islam are impervious to persuasion. It is among the large majority of Arabs and Muslims that we must encourage reform, freedom, democracy, and opportunity, even though our own promotion of these messages is limited in its effectiveness simply because we are its carriers. (537)

The 9/11 Report wisely identifies the foreign population as a critical target and the necessity for a trusted channel to transmit the Coalition message. The message must be presented through foreign governments, religious leaders, and media outlets to ensure both an effective channel of communication and target audience trust in the message. As the 9/11 report indicates, the link with the United States automatically creates bias toward the message in the target audience.⁹²

AQN influence operations have been directed at their target audience in both channel and message. For example, Al Jazeera has become a relatively trusted news source in the Middle East, especially with the proliferation of satellite television in the region. The AQN has used the network as the forum to present its messages. This means the Umma is receiving the message from a trusted source, providing additional credibility to message content. The AQN message is also consistent, it is always based in the

⁹⁰ Douglas Feith, 5.

⁹¹ International legislation would fall under the realm of "Involving the International Community", but there effects would be felt on the global population so they are a combination of both Strategies 1 and 5.

⁹² This portion of the campaign could be greatly enhanced through coordination with the broader DOS campaign in the Battle of ideas. This is just one example of how the two campaigns will continually reinforce one another.

Islamic struggle and all actions are designed to reinforce this message. Additionally, the AQN addresses the Coalition message, portraying the Coalition as lacking in consistency and equality. An example of this is the AQN's questioning of Coalition human rights policies. "All false claims and propaganda [by the Coalition] about 'Human Rights' were hammered down and exposed by the massacres that took place against the Muslims in every part of the world."⁹³ While the Coalition is claiming to operate for equal and fair treatment for everyone, the AQN claims the Coalition actions are strictly based on self interest without consideration for human rights.

Intelligence, Security, and thus Control⁹⁴

Another key point brought out in the earlier Hoffman and Taw quote (as well as from the case study in Chapter IV) is the necessity of the local population's support for intelligence. The population is critical for gaining the intelligence required to conduct operations. The NSCT addresses many of the characteristics required for an effective intelligence structure. The National Strategy states, "the United States must not only rely on technical intelligence, but renew its emphasis on other types of intelligence needed to get inside the organization" (p. 16). RAND researchers Leites and Wolf say that to counter an insurgency "requires a highly developed intelligence system."⁹⁵ The focus on intelligence is critical, and the U.S. has the world's best technical intelligence system, but the AQN are adapting and evading Coalition technological collection capabilities. This means that the emphasis on "other types of intelligence," especially human intelligence, becomes more vital to the success of the Coalition.

The AQN is very effective at gaining the popular support required for intelligence, resources, and recruits. The Coalition has even identified AQN infiltrators/informants within the U.S. military.⁹⁶ This indicates that in certain cases the

⁹³ Usamah bin Laden, *Declaration of War*.

⁹⁴ Dr. Gordon McCormick defines control as: Nothing occurs that I can't see; there is nothing I see that I can't influence. This implies seeing everything, which no one person can do. Therefore to be able to control an area you must have eyes everywhere, which can only be accomplished with the support of the surrounding population. That control then provides the intelligence to act, and the security (early warning) to prevent attacks.

⁹⁵ Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflict*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1970), 74.

⁹⁶ "Traitor in the ranks?" *Navy Times*, (23 August 2004). The article says a disk containing "the e-mail exchanges between Ahmed [a British national arrested for suspected terrorism] and Abujihad

religious ideology of the AQN is successful in countering the ideology of what should be the most politically and nationally motivated members of the Coalition. Conversely there have been very few, if any, “traitors” from within the core of the AQN. The Coalition also operates in open societies making it easier for the AQN to gather intelligence.

Popular support has provided al Qaeda leadership the security required to avoid capture. The most glaring example of this is the continued evasion of Usamah bin Laden and other key leaders of al Qaeda. The Coalition has dedicated large amounts of assets toward the capture of these key leaders. There is also a \$25 million reward for information leading to a capture. Despite the efforts and incentives al Qaeda key leaders continue to avoid capture. This indicates a high level of AQN control over the population; whether through loyalty or fear. The population continues to protect the al Qaeda leaders and the core members of the AQN remain loyal to the cause.

Legitimacy

“Legitimacy, the senior British diplomat Robert Cooper has written, ‘is as much a source of power as force.’”⁹⁷ The United States, as the lone superpower, has the capability to exert force anywhere in the globe; the only constraint on this capability is the legitimacy to wield this force. Thus the most powerful nation in the world can be stopped if it does not have the legitimacy to use its force. Legitimacy cannot be self provided, it can only come from the population and the international community. This is why

The United States can neither appear to be acting, nor in fact act, as if only its self-interest mattered... [T]he world’s sole superpower needs to demonstrate that it wields its great strengths on behalf of its principles and those who share them.⁹⁸

[Destroyer Benfold crewmember] took place between late 2000 through 2001, with an individual who described himself as a Navy sailor on active duty in the Middle East.” The emails contained classified information concerning the “composition of the Constellation carrier battle group, of which Benfold was a member, and details of its planned transit through the Strait of Hormuz. The emails also “[voiced] enmity toward the ‘American enemies’” and “praises those who attacked the USS Cole and the ‘men who have brought honor this week to the ummah in the lands of Jihad...”

⁹⁷ Robert Kagan, “America’s Crisis of Legitimacy,” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 83, No. 2 (2004): 65-87.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 85.

Legitimacy provides the critical support to continue operating. Economically the United States can continue to fight the war alone.

It is more doubtful, however, whether the American people will continue to support both military actions and the burdens of postwar occupations in the face of constant charges of illegitimacy by the United States' closest democratic allies.⁹⁹

Without the legitimacy provided by the population and international community, a force can lose its support at home and abroad. The Coalition is attempting to gain support of the global population (Strategy 1), while denying the AQN support from the Umma (Strategy 2). Conversely, the AQN is attempting to gain support from the Umma (Strategy 1), while denying the Coalition support of the global population (Strategy 2).

The battle for legitimacy is closely tied to the information war and perception management. The Coalition and AQN require popular and international state/non-state support to provide legitimacy to their campaigns. When the cause is no longer deemed legitimate in the eyes of the population, popular support disappears and the *needs* of the force go unfulfilled. This is why both forces base their actions on providing for the population and say the opponent is acting in its own self-interests. The Coalition portrays itself as acting on behalf of the political and economic freedom of the population. The message, according to the NSCT, is that the Coalition will persevere until it “eliminates terrorism as a threat to our way of life”¹⁰⁰ (selfless act) and the AQN is “evil that is intent on threatening and destroying our basic freedoms and our way of life”¹⁰¹ (self interest). The AQN portrays itself as acting on behalf of the religious livelihood of the population. The AQN message is “aimed at defending sanctity and religion”¹⁰² (selfless act) and the Coalition is “occupying the lands of Islam..., plundering its riches..., humiliating its people...”¹⁰³ (self interest).

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, 29.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 1.

¹⁰² Usamah bin Laden, *Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders*, 23 February 1998. Available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm>; accessed 26 October 2004.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

b. Strategy 2 - Separation of the Opponent and the Population

The AQN campaign focuses on portraying the Coalition as crusaders fighting to expand control. The purpose is to influence primarily the global population to deny support to the Coalition because it is waging an illegitimate campaign. The AQN is addressing the political spectrum - expanding dominance of the Coalition - to ensure the message influences the target audience - the global population. Thus the AQN messages are designed to gain support (Strategy 1) from the Umma using religious ideology and to deny support (Strategy 2) to the Coalition from the global population using political rationality. Rather than working with and for the population the Coalition is portrayed as imposing its will on the population. For the AQN, it is critical that the population *believes* the Coalition's actions are motivated by greed and fear.

While terrorism is an offensive tactic, the AQN portrays itself as fighting a defensive battle. The portrayal of a defensive jihad accomplishes two important tasks. First, it serves to provide legitimacy to the jihad by depicting it as a last resort response against an aggressor that could not be avoided. Second, it depicts the campaign as defensive and therefore legitimate within Islam, because "Islam cannot justify aggressive war."¹⁰⁴ Framing the battle as one for Islam serves to gain support from the Umma (Strategy 1) and ensures the Umma denies support to the Coalition (Strategy 2). A devout Muslim cannot provide support to the Coalition without betraying Allah and Islam since the Coalition is waging a war against Islam.

The Coalition strategy focuses on portraying the AQN as terrorists fighting an illegitimate campaign. In this campaign political ideology and the recognized rules of conduct within the international political system are the basis for legitimacy. The Coalition is attempting to prevent popular support for the AQN by portraying the AQN campaign as one that is acting outside the legitimate international system. The label of "terrorist groups of global reach" is in itself an attempt to separate the AQN from the population. Terrorism is an inherently illegitimate cause that cannot be supported without betraying the recognized government, international agreements, and accepted

¹⁰⁴ Ira G. Zepp, *A Muslim Primer: A Beginner's Guide to Islam* 2d edition (Fayetteville, AK: University of Arkansas Press, 2000), 96.

forms of public diplomacy. Therefore a good citizen must provide support to the Coalition (Strategy 1) and deny support to the AQN (Strategy 2).

What the population perceives as motivations is the critical factor. The population must be convinced that all actions are taken on their behalf and in their best interests or popular support will be given to the opponent. If the population does not see the prospect for a better future from one sides cause, support will be given to the opponent. Both sides are fighting for what they believe to be a legitimate cause, the perceived motivations will determine who receives popular support. The Coalition is appealing to the political and economic rationality of the population to deny support to the AQN. The AQN is appealing to the political and religious rationality of the population to deny support to the Coalition. Both approaches have an effect within the Umma and non-Muslim populations, but the AQN religious ideology reaches the Umma at the level of their core values and individual identity.

c. Strategy 3 - Direct Action Against the Opponent

The Coalition approach to the counterinsurgency appears to rely heavily on a kill/capture strategy. Each member of the AQN, and especially the key leaders, killed or captured is a measure of success in the campaign. This approach is exemplified in the NSCT under *defeat* where goals will be obtained by attacking there sanctuaries, leadership, and infrastructure. The NSCT identifies “the final element to the Defeat goal is an aggressive, offensive strategy...” (17).

The NSCT also says that the use of direct action to defeat the enemy cannot be initiated until the AQN are “identified and located” (17). Therefore, aggressive military operations cannot be initiated until critical intelligence is obtained. Forces cannot strike blindly without losing popular support, so while forces are prepared to implement the kill/capture strategy they cannot perform effectively until they have the required intelligence. A focus on direct action leads to stagnant forces waiting for intelligence, rather than integrating with the population to gain the required intelligence. Robert D. Kaplan points to the Coalition return to a direct action focus in Afghanistan following initial success with unconventional tactics as self defeating. “We [the Coalition] have become the Soviets [in Afghanistan]. We are hunkered down in firebases

and get picked at by insurgents who freely move in and out of Pakistan.”¹⁰⁵ The Coalition must approach the use of military force globally, as it did locally in Afghanistan, small elements working with local groups to assist in their struggle against the AQN.

The Coalition use of direct action has served to reduce the support from both the population and the international community. The majority of the global population viewed the invasion of Afghanistan as a legitimate response to the attacks of 11 September 2001. Much of the global population and international community have viewed the invasion of Iraq as illegitimate because the justification for the operation was not proven, WMD have not been located. “The moral argument, not whether WMD is present is the way to frame any discussion of the former Iraqi regime.”¹⁰⁶ Framing the removal of the Iraqi regime as a “moral argument” continues to emphasize to the global population and the international community the legitimacy behind the need for direct action and provides a consistent message for all military action. Tying the operation to WMD has undermined support; when WMD were not found the legitimacy for the operation was removed. Direct action cannot be executed without considerations for its implications on the population and international community. While the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have “heavily strained, if not completely destroyed”¹⁰⁷ the AQN’s initial strategic concept and forced the AQN to adapt; the AQN has capitalized on their losses by exploiting the Coalition operations through propaganda and media outlets, turning tactical losses into strategic gains.

The AQN uses direct action to counter the Coalition and ensure continued dissemination of their message, but - like Hizballah in the 1980’s - they do it with a combination of specific targets and religious approval. The AQN targets are traditionally symbolic in nature to demonstrate the continued struggle against the enemies of Islam. Religious approval comes through the many fatwa’s presented by the AQN. These factors combine to demonstrate that the AQN use of direct action is not intended as much

¹⁰⁵ Robert Kaplan.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ James S. Robbins, “Defeating Networked Terrorism,” in *Defeating Terrorism: Shaping the new Security Environment*, ed. Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer (Guilford: McGraw-Hill Companies, 2004), 75.

to defeat the Coalition as to influence the population. The Attacks on 9/11 were a traumatic blow to the United States both in the cost of human life and economic disruption, but it would take multiple attacks of that magnitude to threaten the continued existence of the Nation. Additionally the AQN would have to conduct similar attacks on many other countries around the world to destroy the Coalition (although the destruction of the United States is viewed as the first step toward defeating the Coalition). The goal of the AQN was to deliver a blow to the United States, but more importantly to send a message to the population. The message is designed to gain the support of the Umma and produce fear (coerce) the populations of countries opposed to the AQN. This was done effectively in Spain where the March 2004 train bombings successfully influenced the removal of Spanish troops from Iraq.

d. Strategy 4 - Separation of the Opponent and the International Community

The Coalition has made it clear that it will counter any support to the AQN from a state actor. The removal of the former Iraqi regime has sent a clear deterrent message to state supporters of the AQN. While states may question the capability of the Coalition to mount a large military response, there is no doubt that at a minimum political and economic pressure will be applied to AQN supporters. Conversely, the message that support to the Coalition provides political and economic benefits is clear. An example of this is Libya, following the resolution of the Lockerbie case and the agreement to disclose and end its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. The UN sanctions on Libya were removed and the country is attempting to integrate into the international community, including application to the World Trade Organization.¹⁰⁸ The Coalition has adopted a carrot or stick approach to influencing the state members of the international community.

The Coalition efforts to deter non-state support for the AQN are unavoidably limited. Many of the non-state actors supporting the AQN are terrorist organizations active in their respective global regions. The Coalition can not afford to address them directly, for fear of lending legitimacy to their cause; the byproduct of acknowledgement from a recognized state actor. While the Coalition cannot afford to

¹⁰⁸ U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Libya," *The World Factbook*, last updated 19 October 2004; Available from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ly.html>; accessed 29 October 2004.

legitimize terrorist organizations, there are other non-state members of the international community that must be addressed to counter the AQN strategy 4 efforts. The AQN legitimacy is based in religious ideology, as such the Coalition must counter the AQN in the same battlespace. The Coalition must demonstrate how its message of freedom and democracy is in line with Islam instead of counter to it. Only Muslims leaders, especially the Ulema (learned scholars in Islamic law and teaching and thus leaders in the Islamic community), are capable of convincing the Muslim community of this point. Many of the Ulema have denounced the violent tactics of the AQN as un-Islamic,¹⁰⁹ but the message has not been seized upon and reinforced by the Coalition. Additionally, moderate Muslim governments and international organizations must be encouraged to reinforce their messages against the AQN.

The AQN focus is to de-legitimize the Coalition operations in the eyes of the international community. There is a direct correlation between the size of the Coalition and the AQN's freedom of action and mobility. AQN freedom of action and mobility increases the smaller the group that comprises the Coalition becomes. Each state that questions the legitimacy of the Coalition provides a twofold effect for the AQN. First, that state is no longer a participant in the Coalition reducing the size of the coalition. Second, that state is now actively questioning the actions of the Coalition, diverting Coalition time and resources from the fight with the AQN to justifying their actions. The AQN has achieved this effect through the media by continually questioning the legitimacy of the Coalition actions. This is where the Coalition information operations are failing; the counter points to the AQN messages are not being conducted in the same channel (if at all) that the AQN is utilizing. Therefore the people that the AQN reaches are not the ones that the Coalition is reaching.

The AQN understands the Coalition requirement for state support and uses military action and threats to reach the states that support the legitimacy of the Coalition

¹⁰⁹ For examples of this see: "Pakistan Muslim Clerics Issue Fatwa against Sectarian Killings", *Associated Press of Pakistan news agency*, 3 June 2004, <http://www.nexis.com>; accessed 7 November 2004. "Ulema condemns killing of innocent Christians," *Pakistan Press International, the Pakistan Newswire*, 3 November 2001, <http://www.nexis.com>, accessed 7 November 2004. "Saudi Muslim leaders condemn terror attacks on non-Muslims," *Agence France Presse -- English*, 14 June 2004, <http://www.nexis.com>, accessed 7 November 2004. "Public Statements by Senior Saudi Officials condemning Extremism and Promoting Moderation," May 2004, available from http://www.saudiembassy.net/ReportLink/Report_Extremism_May04.pdf; accessed 8 November 2004.

(i.e. provide active and passive support to the Coalition). Examples of this at the local level can be seen in Iraq with the ransoming of hostages for the removal of troops. On the global level this can be seen in bin Laden's October 2004 statement. "Your security is in your own hands. Each and every state that does not tamper with our security will have automatically assured its own security."¹¹⁰ The AQN is using terrorist acts and the threat of terrorist attacks as a means to deter state involvement in the Coalition.

The use of direct action by the Coalition has also provided the AQN with an abundance of propaganda to exploit. The invasion of Iraq, for example, is constantly being framed by the AQN as an illegitimate unilateral action, but the Coalition has not responded in the foreign media to justify its actions. So while in the U.S. the justification is made (and only influencing a portion of the population), other key target audiences are not given any counter to the information the AQN presents. An example of a more effective operation is the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) (1SFG(A)) actions during Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines. The combined operations of the Philippine military and 1SFG(A) were focused on gaining trust and building contacts within the local population, which were effective enough to negate the Abu Sayyaf Group's (ASG) influence. These actions "got the Filipino media reporting positively about the U.S. forces, something that hadn't happened since before the closing of the bases there."¹¹¹ This is an example of strategic victory because the Coalition succeeded and did not have to justify its actions; the local media did it for them.¹¹²

e. Strategy 5 - Involving the International Community

The Coalition, as a coalition of state actors, must work within the confines of international law, a restriction that does not concern the AQN. Coalition legitimacy of action can only be achieved through operations that are in accordance with these laws. This means that it is critical for the Coalition to gain the support of the international community to counter the global AQN presence. The Coalition must gain individual

¹¹⁰ "Excerpts: Bin Laden video," *BBC News, UK edition*, 29 October 2004; available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3966817.stm; Internet; accessed 31 October 2004.

¹¹¹ Robert. D. Kaplan.

¹¹² The Philippine example further reinforces the effectiveness of the McCormick COIN Model. The JTF-510 Commander, BG Donald Wurster, briefed that the strategic intent for the operation was based on an earlier example of the McCormick COIN Model. The briefing was given at the 8-10 July 2003 SOF Education Conference at JSOU, Hurlburt Field, FL.

state support where there is an AQN presence to counter the threat and where there is no AQN presence to prevent its emergence.

In addition to providing legitimacy, nation states also serve as force multipliers in the fight against the AQN. In an intra-state insurgency the federal government normally does not have the capability to monitor every region in the country; it must work through and/or with the local governments to ensure control in those regions. In the global insurgency the Coalition does not have the capability to monitor every country in the globe; it must work through and/or with each state government to provide control in their “local” region. As the NSCT says:

Where states are willing and able, we will reinvigorate old partnerships and forge new ones... Where states are weak but willing, we will support them vigorously... Where states are reluctant, we will work with our partners to convince them to change course and meet their international obligations. Where states are unwilling, we will act decisively to counter the threat they pose and, ultimately, to compel them to cease supporting terrorism. (12)

The National Strategy addresses the need to foster relationships with regional partners. Working through allies, agents, or surrogates is a critical means of gaining the required intelligence to counter the global insurgent. As the NSCT correctly states “our regional partners are often better poised than the United States to gain access to information and intelligence” (16). The Coalition, as the coalition stands today, does not have the capability to penetrate or the manpower to actively operate in every region of the world. Fostering relationships world wide will allow the Coalition to act in conjunction with local military, police, and intelligence systems. The United States is not alone in the global war on terrorism and by fostering international relationships can operate more efficiently and effectively.

USD(P) Feith’s speech discussed “striking them [the terrorists] abroad where they do so much of their recruiting, training, equipping and planning” (p. 4). This shows a proper global focus for the U.S. strategy, but execution not intent is the critical factor. The U.S. must take action through and/or with local state governments to be able to “strike them abroad.” Successful examples of this can be seen in Pakistan, the Philippines, Colombia, the Horn of Africa, and other regions around the world, but the

effort must continue to expand. The Coalition must maintain its global perspective to counter the terrorist threat. An international focus allows the Coalition to assist local governments to counter the AQN in their country; this is in both the respective country and Coalition's best interests. By working in conjunction with local forces, the Coalition continues to expand, reducing the freedom of action and mobility of the AQN. Providing security and intelligence assistance is a force multiplier that reduces the burden on the current Coalition military and civilian personnel.

The AQN focus concerning state actors in the international community is Strategy 4. As a non-state actor they are operating outside the recognized norms of international law, which limits the AQN ability to form alliances with recognized states. Any state discovered forming an alliance with the AQN must consider the ramifications of their actions. The Coalition and international organizations have shown a willingness to take action against states supporting the AQN. A state supporter of the AQN knows that it will face political and economic sanctions as well as possible military action. While there are states that favor the AQN cause over the Coalition, there are very few that see the benefit of supporting the AQN as greater than the costs that support, if discovered, will incur. Indicating the Coalition is more successful at deterring state support (Strategy 4) than the AQN is at gaining state support (Strategy 5)

Thus, the AQN main focus is on gaining the support of non-state actors. Muslim groups and terrorist organizations are often the target of efforts to expand the AQN global presence. So while the AQN is not focusing on nation state support, it is attempting to build a global presence through the Muslim communities of the world. Additionally al Qaeda is attempting to become a player in ongoing international conflicts; participation in these conflicts will reinforce the al Qaeda's self appointed role as the global defenders of Islam. For example, al Qaeda declared responsibility for the attacks on an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa, Kenya in an attempt to influence the Palestine-Israeli conflict. They also declare support for the Muslim fighters in Chechnya, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, and other areas throughout the globe.

C. ANALYSIS OF THE FIVE STRATEGIES

Strategy 1: Struggle for Support of the Population

Increased focus on the religious ideological support for the AQN. The Coalition strategy must address the religious ideological appeal of the AQN message. The population must understand that the Coalition goals are to provide freedom and democracy in conjunction with religious beliefs, rather than instead of them. The AQN currently controls the religious ideological spectrum. The Coalition must counter the AQN message by working with the Ulema to oppose the perception that the Coalition goals are anti-Islamic. Crafting a campaign that emphasizes religious unity and highlights the non-Islamic practices of the AQN will slowly undermine the AQN's most critical support base. The strategy "must aim to stem the flow of people into the ranks of the terrorists. Doing this requires a focus on the widespread ideological support for terrorism."¹¹³

Globally focused influence operations. The Coalition information war must maintain a global focus. The message presented by the Coalition must be conducted through an effective channel that will reach the target audience. The message must also be consistent with the actions of the Coalition. In the Middle East a critical communications channel is television, the Coalition must have Arab speaking representatives presenting its message in a way that directly reaches the Umma. The spokesmen can be from the U.S. State Department, representatives of Moderate/allied Muslim governments, like minded Ulema, or ideally all of the above. The message must be presented from a unified front. Connection with the United States has a negative effect on the message, therefore the more "neutral" spokesmen utilized the greater the acceptance. A broader acceptance of the message will have the added effect of increasing legitimacy to the Coalition cause.

Increased emphasis on non-technical methods of intelligence gathering, specifically HUMINT. Hoffman and Taw say that "human intelligence (HUMINT) is especially important in terrorism or insurgency, where the enemy is indistinguishable

¹¹³ Douglas Feith.

from the general population.”¹¹⁴ The AQN has demonstrated the capability to evade Coalition technical intelligence collection methods. This indicates the necessity for increased non-technical methods, especially HUMINT. Establishing HUMINT networks is a slow process, it takes time to identify and gain the trust of potential informants. Ideally the networks are in place prior to the need for them arising, rather than attempting to develop a network once a region is identified. The Coalition must be pre-emptive in this aspect of the intelligence system; establishing global networks early to deny safe havens and/or track AQN movements. Only through integrating with the general population can control be established over a particular area, especially when the opponent is indistinguishable from the general population. Unlike conventional warfare where control is established by seizing terrain, in an insurgency control can only be established through the population.

Strategy 2: Separation of the Opponent and the Population

Discredit AQN legitimacy at its Islamic core. The message to deny AQN support of the Umma must be based in Islam. The AQN message is based on these teachings and therefore must be countered at its roots. The Coalition must present the AQN as waging a non-Islamic campaign. This message can best be conducted with/through the Ulema and Islamic organizations to provide credibility. Potential areas of emphasis include countering the legality of the AQN’s fatwa’s.

Certain Muslim factions, in the name of *self-interest*, will engage in political struggle and call it jihad, but no individual or group can arbitrarily wage jihad. Only the state, through its leaders - the caliph or imam - can authorize a holy war.¹¹⁵

The purpose of this paper is to identify areas for strategic influence, not specific points of attack; that can be decided by those better suited for the task. The reason fatwa’s were highlight is to demonstrate that there are ways to counter the AQN message at the core of its legitimacy. It is by attacking this core that the most powerful and effective messages are made.

¹¹⁴ Hoffman and Taw, 138.

¹¹⁵ Ira G. Zepp, 97. Emphasis added.

Aggressively reinforce Coalition messages of freedom, democracy, and tolerance.

In addition to undermining the AQN legitimacy, the Coalition must counter the AQN messages directed at the Coalition motivations. Perceptions must be shaped so that the Coalition motivations do not continue to appear to be greed and fear. If the Coalition is truly acting out of a desire to spread freedom, democracy, and tolerance, that message must be made clear to the population which includes ensuring the population understands what freedom and democracy provides.

Strategy 3: Direct Action Against the Opponent

Base direct action efforts on their strategic influence rather than tactical impact.

The Coalition is using direct action to tactically defeat the AQN. Direct action must focus less on tactical defeat and become a tool for influencing the population to achieve strategic defeat. The AQN is currently doing this with greater success.

Large conventional forces cannot execute direct action effectively until the support of the population has been secured. A small portion of the Coalition can be utilized to conduct direct attacks on the AQN, as long as their operations are used to support the overall campaign and do not detract from the main effort of influencing/controlling the population. For example a small successful surgical strike against a key leader has significant influence on the population. The capture of a key leader shows that the insurgent is not invincible and also serves to disrupt the AQN for fear of the intelligence the detainee may reveal. The inherent danger in this tactic is that military operations can be exploited by the AQN for propaganda purposes. Tactically successful military operations have been spun by the AQN into strategically damaging propaganda.¹¹⁶ Direct action operations must remain a supporting effort to the overall campaign. The main effort of the Coalition must be to establish control. Once control is established the AQN will be left with two alternatives: either disperse, hide, and survive or mount a final desperate attack and become easy targets for the more powerful and better resourced Coalition. In either situation the AQN becomes an ineffective fighting force. Direct action does not provide control; control provides the ability to conduct effective direct action.

¹¹⁶ Examples of this can be seen in well planned and executed military operations that the IF claims killed innocent civilians or the often used attack on a “wedding party.”

Strategy 4: Separation of the Opponent and the International Community

Increased emphasis on the primary AQN support base in the International Community, the non-State actors. The Coalition's effective deterrent message to the state actors must also be applied to the non-state actors of the international community. Non-state actors, through their control of terrain, have the ability to provide safe havens and other support to the AQN. Additionally they can provide the AQN access to potential targets, resources, and manpower. The Coalition must deter non-state support to the AQN. This is a much more difficult task, because the strength of international law and legitimacy do not affect many of the non-state actors.¹¹⁷ As non-state organization, many of them are operating beyond international law, therefore threats of political and economic reprisals do not produce the desired coercive effect. The cost of supporting the AQN must be raised to an unacceptable level to separate the non-state actors from the AQN. The Coalition must increase the costs on the non-state actors that support the AQN. The costs the non-state actor incurs for supporting the AQN must be shown to jeopardize the non-state actor's objectives. The Coalition can accomplish this by direct action, which runs the risk of decreased popular and international community opinion, or through intensified influence operations on the non-state actor's support base. Once again the center of gravity becomes the population.

Work through and with allies, especially Muslim Governments/Organizations. The Coalition must identify moderate Muslim governments/organizations and provide them support. This demonstrates that there are benefits to supporting the Coalition as well as provides an example that the Coalition is working with the Muslim community. This will further separate the AQN from the international community. The Ulema and other Muslim representation can play a key role in influencing the international community, just as in influencing the population.

¹¹⁷ As non-state actors many of the organization are operating outside of international law already, therefore breaking additional international laws is a minor concern. These organizations' legitimacy does not come from the international community. Legitimacy is derived from their ideology (political or religious), therefore perceived legitimacy from the international community is of less concern than the perception of the population they are attempting to convince of their ideology.

Strategy 5: Involving the International Community

Continue to reinforce/expand State support for the Coalition. The focus of the AQN on non-state support and Coalition on state support should not be a surprise. The AQN, as a non-state actor, is focusing on gaining the support of other non-state members of the international community; just as the Coalition as a coalition of state actors is focused on support from state members. The key to the international community is how each force reacts to the opponent's strategy. The AQN has identified the requirement of the Coalition for strong state support from the international community. Therefore the AQN has used this information to drive their strategy to separate the opponent from the international community (Strategy 4).

The Coalition must execute operations utilizing the principle of economy of force. Local forces (who then become part of the Coalition) must provide for their own sovereignty. The local forces are also often better suited to execute the required operations, both in ability and with cultural sensitivity. Additionally working through local governments can add legitimacy to the Coalition's efforts and prevent the perception that the U.S. is imposing its will without consideration of the local government.

Coalition Strategies must retain a global emphasis and appeal. The NSCT is a statement to Americans that the government is trying to "protect not just the lives but the liberty of the American people" (Feith, p. 3). The goal internationally is not to protect the American way of life, but to support stable governments to protect their own way of life. The Coalition objective must be made clear. The U.S., as the lead state in the Coalition, must ensure the statements it makes are framed such that they support the Coalition's mission and apply to the global population and international community, not just Americans. It must be understood that the U.S. objective is to support global stability, not impose the American way of life. For example, the United States is not going to get the Pakistani government to fight terrorists to protect the American way of life. Pakistani support will only be secured by demonstrating to the Pakistani government how countering the AQN in its territory will reinforce Pakistan's national interests. The

Pakistani forces must understand that they are operating directly in support of the Pakistani government and way of life, which indirectly supports the American way of life.

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V. CONCLUSIONS

You must fight your adversary with the word, as well as with the sword.
You must win the war of ideas, as well as the battle of bullets.

From an article about the Legacy of Ronald Reagan¹¹⁸

A. THE UTILITY OF THE MODEL

The utility of analyzing the war on terrorism as a global insurgency is that it indicates a shift in the main emphasis for the conduct of the war. The primary emphasis must shift to, and remain on, the population. Rather than applying the majority of the coalition's resources to countering the network directly, the global insurgency analysis indicates that focusing on the network's support base and resources is a more effective method of defeating the AQN. Gaining popular support strengthens the Coalition's ability to counter the AQN, while simultaneously draining the network of its ability to operate; the most basic and essential *needs* go unfulfilled and the network will fail to retain a global influence.

Another dynamic of a global counterinsurgency campaign is that all elements of national power must play a role. The U.S. military's mission is to fight and win the nation's wars, but to fight an insurgency requires more than just the military. A global counterinsurgency campaign requires an alternate strategic framework for the military and to be ultimately successful requires a new strategic focus for every element of national power. Only through a unified and mutually supporting effort can an insurgency be defeated. Military, diplomatic, economic, and legislative efforts all must be synchronized and united toward achieving the common overarching objective: the defeat of the insurgent and its underlying causes.

The application of an insurgency/counterinsurgency perspective serves to diminish the distinction between the twofold enemy indicated in the 9/11 Commission Report: al Qaeda and the radical ideological movement. The global insurgency perspective does not separate one from the other, the two combine to form a common enemy that requires a unified counter effort. The AQN is the insurgent and radical

¹¹⁸ Ariel Cohen, "The Global Warrior," *Tech Central Station*, 8 June 2004 [journal online]; available from <http://remotefarm.techcentralstation.com/060804J.html>; Internet; accessed 25 November 2004.

Islamism is the ideology they use to rally support. This would be similar to an intrastate insurgent espousing communism, or any other ideology of economic and/or social reform, to rally support against the recognized authority. You cannot address the insurgent without also addressing the ideology.

The main effort for the Coalition must be to gain popular support (Strategy 1). The indirect effect of gaining popular support is the denial of popular support to the AQN (Strategy 2). The analysis highlights the AQN reliance on the population for continued existence and its ability to continue operating. Therefore gaining popular support reinforces the Coalition efforts, while diminishing the AQN capabilities. Gaining popular support is the key to dismantling the AQN. First, popular support lends legitimacy to the conduct of operations, the legitimacy required to operate freely and effectively to counter the AQN. Second, support of the population provides the necessary intelligence to locate the AQN members. As popular support increases the AQN security decreases, they can no longer hide within the population. The AQN members lose the ability to move and operate freely when they fear the population around them. Third, without the population, the resources required for the AQN members subsistence and operations are no longer available. Fourth, gaining popular support removes the recruitment base from the network, this reduces the AQN ability to regenerate and expand the network. While gaining popular support is the main effort and most important consideration for conducting the global COIN campaign, it is also the most difficult. It is a slow process, especially in regions where current support for the coalition is minimal.

The secondary emphasis is on gaining support of the international community (Strategy 5). Continued expansion of the coalition applies pressure on the AQN. The broader the coalition the more effective it becomes. Additionally, the AQN must be cut off from the resources that the international community can provide (Strategy 4). No single nation has the strength, much less the authority, to counter the AQN everywhere it appears. The coalition must continue to expand in order to apply pressure on the network globally. Just as an intrastate COIN effort relies on local governments to control their

regions, the global COIN effort must rely on each country to provide “a strong, united international front against terrorism.”¹¹⁹

The Coalition must limit the use of direct action against the AQN (Strategy 3). Effective use of direct action requires a high degree of intelligence on the target to minimize causing collateral damage. Excessive force and/or collateral damage results in decreased popular and international community support. The previous analyses indicate the use of excessive force only hinders the counterinsurgency effort. All efforts to use direct action must be done with consideration for their effects on the main and secondary efforts.

B. A WAY AHEAD

This analysis of the war on terrorism as a global insurgency provides strategic planning recommendations for the war. All of the recommendations are already ongoing in one form or another, the key to their successful implementation is a shift in emphasis. The current focus is on direct confrontation of the opponent and disruption of the network. The analysis presented indicates the need to shift emphasis toward influencing the population and the international community. This can be accomplished with three mutually supporting strategies for the campaign: Short Range Strategy - Interdict leadership/infrastructure, Mid Range Strategy - Global counter network, Long Range Strategy - Underlying Causes/War of Ideas.

1. Short Range Strategy - Interdict leadership/infrastructure (Supporting Effort 1)

Strategic recommendation addressed:

- *Base direct action efforts on their strategic influence rather than tactical impact.*

This strategy is a stop gap measure designed to provide development time for the mid and long range strategies. The terrorists cannot be allowed to retain/regain the initiative. Continued interdiction efforts will disrupt current terrorist planning and operations to ensure “the primary focus of the members of al Qaeda is survival.”¹²⁰ These operations are a supporting effort to the mid and long range strategies which focus on establishing control and defeating the terrorist threat, rather than to disrupt and attack.

¹¹⁹ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, 19.

¹²⁰ James S. Robbins, 76.

This strategy is a supporting effort and as such requires only a small portion of the overall military effort. Small, highly mobile elements can maintain the pressure on the AQN, while the primary emphasis is on supporting the mid and long range strategies.

2. Mid Range Strategy - Global Counter Network (Supporting Effort 2)

Strategic recommendations addressed:

- *Increased emphasis on non-technical methods of intelligence gathering, specifically HUMINT.*
- *Increased emphasis on the primary AQN support base in the International Community, the non-State actor.*
- *Work through and with allies, especially Muslim Government/Organizations.*
- *Continue to reinforce/expand State support for the Coalition.*

Dr. McCormick defined control as “seeing everything that occurs and being able to influence everything I see.” To be able to see everything requires “eyes” everywhere and cannot be accomplished through strictly technical means. The U.S. dominance in technical collection capabilities greatly enhances our ability to see everything, but against an opponent that can easily blend with the local population a Global HUMINT network of informants must be established.

We need intelligence from the local civilians and soldiers from the area who understand the language, customs, and dynamics of the local situation, who can easily point out strangers in the area even though they speak the same language, but look different.¹²¹

This does not mean that U.S. forces need to be operating in every country/region; local governments can, and must, provide for control in their own countries. The exchange of training and information will facilitate the establishment and effectiveness of the counter network.

To be able to “influence everything I see” indicates the ability to project force everywhere that there are “eyes.” The projection of force can be from U.S. personnel on the ground, surrogate forces, an armed predator overhead, or many other methods. The United States has the capability to project forces anywhere in the world, but for the counter network to be effective and efficient the time to project force must be minimal.

¹²¹ Rick Webster, “Counterinsurgency: The John Paul Vann Model,” *Sitrep*, Winter/Spring 2004; available from <http://www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/johnpaulvann.htm>; Internet; accessed 28 November 2004.

This means that the people running the network in a given region (whether U.S. or Allies) must have the capability and authority to act on intelligence immediately. By achieving Dr. McCormick's level of control in a region, that region is denied to the AQN. Terrorists entering the controlled region are monitored and either interdicted or tracked to develop further intelligence.

3. Long Range Strategy - Underlying Causes/War of Ideas (Main Effort)

Strategic recommendations addressed:

- *Increased focus on the religious ideological support for the AQN.*
- *Globally focused influence operations.*
- *Discredit AQN legitimacy at its Islamic core.*
- *Aggressively reinforce Coalition messages of freedom, democracy, and tolerance.*
- *Coalition strategies must retain a global emphasis and appeal.*

As USD(P) Feith states "the war on terrorism will never end if all we do is disrupt and attack terrorist networks."¹²² The short and mid range strategies are designed to disrupt and control the terrorists. The long range strategy focuses on the core ideological support to the terrorists. As long as the population continues to provide support to the AQN, there will continue to be a threat to the United States. To create an "international environment inhospitable to terrorists and all those who support them"¹²³ the United States must first address the underlying causes of the threat. Only then can the threat be diminished. "To win in a global battle of ideas, a global strategy for communicating those ideas is essential."¹²⁴

All three strategies must be initiated simultaneously. The mid and long range strategies require time before any sign of effectiveness becomes evident. In the case of the war of ideas, results may be measured in generations rather than years. A mid or long range strategy does not mean that it is initiated in the mid or long term future. All three must be initiated immediately and prosecuted aggressively.

¹²² Douglas J. Feith.

¹²³ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Countering Terrorism*, 11.

¹²⁴ Defense Science Board, "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," September 2004, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf (accessed 24 November 2004).

While these strategies are only one course of action for countering the Global Insurgency, the intent of highlighting them is to demonstrate a plan that maintains an emphasis on the population. There are various ways to implement the strategies outlined by Dr. McCormick's model; the key is to emphasize gaining and maintaining popular support for the campaign.

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